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ABSTRACT
While physicians’ financial relationships with pharmaceutical and
medical device manufacturers are increasingly of concern to
legislators and regulators, plaintiffs have had only limited success
pursuing private law remedies for the harms that result from conflicts
of interest. Courts have long channeled individual patients’ claims
against their conflicted doctors into the medical malpractice cause of
action, where patients have difficulty establishing that their
physicians’ conflicts caused them to suffer concrete and compensable
injuries. With recent notable exceptions, courts have also blocked
patients’ claims against drug and device manufacturers. Courts apply
the learned intermediary doctrine to dispose of failure-to-warn
personal injury suits, without regard to whether the plaintiff’s
physician had a financial relationship with the defendant
manufacturer. Third-party payers, such as employers, insurance
companies, and union health and welfare funds, have similarly
struggled to overcome a strong presumption of physician
independence. Courts routinely find that a physician’s prescribing
decision breaks the chain of causation between a manufacturer’s illegal
promotional efforts and a payer’s obligation to pay for a prescription,
even when those promotional efforts include the payment of
kickbacks.
Courts can and should move beyond the “independent physician”
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litigation heuristic. In personal injury cases, courts can do this by
engaging in a fact-based analysis of not just whether a financial
relationship affected a physician’s decision to prescribe a drug or
device but also whether the defendant drug or device company
intended the relationship to have such an effect. The latter inquiry is
more straightforward than the former, which could work to plaintiffs’
advantage, and it is equally relevant to the question whether the
learned intermediary doctrine should apply. In economic injury cases,
courts can move beyond the heuristic by allowing plaintiffs to use
standard statistical methods to demonstrate that physicians’
prescribing decisions were not independent in the aggregate. If the
doctrine were to evolve in these ways, it would bring closer the goal
of ensuring that patients and payers are fairly compensated for the
harms caused by conflicts of interest. It would also provide an
additional incentive to drug and device companies to ensure that the
payments they make to physicians are legitimate.
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INTRODUCTION
Many scholars who have considered the role of private enforcement
in the modern regulatory state have concluded that “litigant regulation”
is inferior to regulation promulgated and enforced by an administrative
agency or other centralized authority.1 Similarly, scholars who study
physicians and their relationships with the pharmaceutical and medical
device industries tend to focus on legislative and regulatory fixes to
conflict of interest concerns, while discounting or ignoring the private
law landscape. Not all of the significant gaps that exist in the
regulatory structure governing physician-industry relationships can or
will be filled by formal regulation, however. Private lawsuits brought
by patients and third-party payers could play a salutary gap-filling role.
Whether they do so will depend on how the doctrine—which is in a
state of flux—evolves.
While physicians’ financial relationships with pharmaceutical and
medical device manufacturers are increasingly of concern to
legislators and regulators, plaintiffs have had only limited success
pursuing private law remedies for the harms that result from conflicts
of interest.2 Courts have long channeled individual patients’ claims
1. See David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616, 619 (2013)
(explaining that “[c]ritics . . . cast private enforcement as overzealous, uncoordinated, and democratically
unaccountable”); Christopher D. Zalesky, Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices: Balancing Public Health
and Law Enforcement Interests; Moving Beyond Regulation-Through-Litigation, 39 J. HEALTH L. 235,
243 (2006) (opining that “[r]egulation through litigation may be better than no regulation at all, but it is
clearly neither the best nor the only choice available with regard to regulation of pharmaceutical marketing
practices” (footnote omitted)).
2. See Christopher T. Robertson, The Money Blind: How to Stop Industry Bias in Biomedical Science,
Without Violating the First Amendment, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 358, 363–64 (2011) (explaining that “the
pharmaceutical and medical device industries may face potential liability [for biasing biomedical science]
in the extreme cases that rise to outright fraud, but only on the rare occasion that it can be detected by
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against their conflicted doctors into the medical malpractice cause of
action, where patients have difficulty establishing that their
physicians’ conflicts caused them to suffer concrete and compensable
injuries.3 Courts have also blocked patients’ claims against drug and
device manufacturers.4 Nearly all courts apply the learned
intermediary doctrine, even where the plaintiff’s physician has a
financial relationship with the defendant manufacturer.5 Third-party
payers, such as employers, insurance companies, and union health and
welfare funds, have similarly struggled to overcome a strong
presumption of physician independence.6 Courts regularly find that a
physician’s prescribing decision breaks the chain of causation between
a manufacturer’s illegal promotional efforts and a payer’s obligation
to pay for a prescription, even when those promotional efforts include
the payment of kickbacks.7
A handful of recent cases have gone the other way, however,
including Murthy v. Abbott Laboratories, in which a district court in
Texas declined to dismiss the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim on the
grounds that a financial relationship between the plaintiff’s physician
and the defendant manufacturer made the learned intermediary
doctrine inapplicable, and Kaiser Foundation Health Plan v. Pfizer, in
plaintiffs, proven in ex post litigation, and where causation of a specific and tangible harm can be
demonstrated”); see also Robert Gatter, Walking the Talk of Trust in Human Subjects Research: The
Challenge of Regulating Financial Conflicts of Interest, 52 EMORY L.J. 327, 375–83 (2003)
(characterizing private enforcement of conflicts of interest standards as absent or weak).
3. See, e.g., D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that “the
gravamen of the complaint sounds in medical malpractice . . . [because] the kickback scheme involving
[a] doctor, drug manufacturer, and drug distributor was dependent on the medical diagnosis, treatment,
and care of the patients”).
4. See, e.g., Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 164 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying the learned
intermediary doctrine and dismissing plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim despite plaintiff’s physician’s
consulting relationship with the defendant device manufacturer).
5. See id. at 163–64.
6. See Anita Bernstein, Enhancing Drug Effectiveness and Efficacy Through Personal Injury
Litigation, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1051, 1069 (2007). Bernstein explains that “[t]hird-party payors include
governments (notably Medicaid at the state level, some federal programs like the Veterans Administration,
and more recently Medicare), insurers, and some employers that administer health plans.” Id. Because
they “do most of their drug purchasing in bulk[,]” third-party payers, “unlike physicians and patients, are
positioned to negotiate terms with the seller.” Id. Finally, their “principal cost-containment device” is the
formulary, which is a database that tells them “which drugs to prefer for the treatment of which
conditions.” Id.
7. Timothy S. Hall, Reimagining the Learned Intermediary Rule for the New Pharmaceutical
Marketplace, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 193, 196 (2004).
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which the First Circuit Court of Appeals approved of the use of a
regression analysis to determine what percentage of prescriptions of
the anti-epileptic drug Neurontin was caused by the defendants’
fraudulent marketing.8
The plaintiff in the former case, Gayathri Murthy, participated in a
clinical trial of Humira, a rheumatoid arthritis drug manufactured by
the defendant, Abbott Laboratories.9 Murthy’s rheumatologist, Dr.
Jovan M. Popovich, was one of the clinical trial’s investigators and
Abbott paid him for his work.10 After Murthy developed cancer, she
sued Abbott for, among other things, negligent failure-to-warn.11
Murthy argued that, because Abbott compensated her doctor for his
role running the clinical trial, the learned intermediary doctrine did not
apply and Abbott had an obligation to warn her of the risks of Humira,
instead of, or in addition to, Dr. Popovich.12 In a decision issued in
November of 2011, the Murthy court adopted the plaintiff’s argument
and found, as a matter of law, that “Abbott cannot avail itself of the
learned intermediary doctrine.”13 The decision was supported with
references to social science research on physician attitudes toward
financial relationships with the pharmaceutical industry and to
research on the influence on behavior of even token gifts.14 The court
also cited to an article expressing concerns about physicianinvestigators who are responsible for recruiting and enrolling
participants into clinical trials being compensated on a per capita
basis.15 The Murthy court concluded that “a doctor who receives gifts
or compensation from a drug company may no longer, ‘as the
prescriber, stand[] between the drug and the ultimate consumer,’ as the
8. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. (In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig.),
712 F.3d 21, 30 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 786 (2013); Murthy v. Abbott Labs., 847 F. Supp. 2d
958, 971 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
9. Murthy, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 963–64.
10. Id. at 964.
11. Id. at 965.
12. See id. at 964, 977. Murthy alleged that neither the “Consent to Participate” document she signed
nor the Humira package insert provided her with an adequate warning of the increased risk of cancer
associated with the drug. Id. at 964.
13. Murthy v. Abbott Labs., No. 4:11-cv-105, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129102, at *27 (S.D. Tex. Nov.
7, 2011), superseded by 847 F. Supp. 2d 958.
14. Id. at *26 n.5.
15. Id. at *26 n.6.
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doctor has an incentive to prescribe a particular drug or, in this case,
enroll a patient in a clinical trial.”16
The court’s decision, and particularly its conclusion that Dr.
Popovich’s financial relationship with Abbott compromised his
independence, was widely reported and, at least in some quarters,
heavily criticized.17 Defense attorney James M. Beck called Murthy
“loud wrong,”18 noting that it “announced what amounts to a per se
rule that any doctor receiving compensation for participating in a
clinical trial involving an investigational drug can’t qualify as a
learned intermediary under Texas law, although, of course, both side’s
[sic] experts can be paid much more.”19
In March of 2012, in response to a motion seeking permission to
appeal, the Murthy court withdrew its November decision and issued
a new one in its place.20 The court’s discussion of the learned
intermediary doctrine was largely unchanged, except that it was no
longer willing to conclude as a matter of law that Dr. Popovich’s
independence was compromised.21 Rather, the court wrote, it “would
have to examine the factual circumstances surrounding the
compensation of [the plaintiff’s] physician in order to evaluate whether
application of the learned intermediary doctrine is appropriate”
because, “when a physician receives compensation or gifts from drug
companies, his or her role as the neutral decision-maker may be
16. Id. at *26.
17. See, e.g., John T. Aquino, Learned Intermediary Doctrine Irrelevant When Physician is Paid,
Federal Court Holds, BNA MED. RES. L. & POL’Y REP., Nov. 16, 2011; James M. Beck, The 10 Worst
Drug/Medical Device Decisions of 2011, LAW360 (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.law360.com/articles/
299834/the-10-worst-drug-medical-device-decisions-of-2011.
18. James M. Beck, Ugly Texas Decision Ignores Erie, Tramples State Law, DRUG & DEVICE L. (Nov.
11, 2011), http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2011/11/ugly-texas-decision-ignores-erie.html.
19. Beck, supra note 17; cf. Miller v. Pfizer Inc. (Roerig Div.), 196 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1129 & n.108
(D. Kan. 2002). The Miller v. Pfizer court held that:
No reasonable jury . . . would find that Dr. Geenens is lying when he says that additional
warnings were not necessary and would not have changed his decision to prescribe Zoloft
to Matthew. In so holding, the Court does not disregard the possible bias in Dr. Geenens’
testimony arising from his business relationship with Pfizer, i.e. the fact that at or near the
time he prescribed Zoloft for Matthew, Dr. Geenens was a paid consultant for Pfizer.
Rather, the Court holds that no reasonable jury would discredit his testimony—which is
not refuted by any direct of circumstantial evidence—on that ground alone.
Id.
20. Murthy v. Abbott Labs., 847 F. Supp. 2d 958, 963 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
21. See id. at 967.
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diminished.”22 This was dicta, because the court went on to dismiss
the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim pursuant to a Texas statute
providing that warnings approved by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) for FDA-approved indications are presumed
adequate.23
The Murthy decision was newsworthy because the court did not
presume that the plaintiff’s physician was independent of the
defendant manufacturer or that the physician’s decision making was
unaffected by a conflict of interest. The Murthy court declined to
deploy the heuristic of the “independent physician” that plays a central
role in doctrinal analysis in drug and device litigation.
Litigation heuristics, essentially judicial reasoning and decision
making shortcuts, are described in an article by Stephen Bainbridge
and Mitu Gulati in which they catalog ten securities law doctrines
which, on their account, have two defining features.24 First, the
doctrines that Bainbridge and Gulati deem to be litigation heuristics
are founded on a superficial, or at least not self-evidently correct,
parsing of subtle questions of fact and inference.25 Judges invoking the
puffery doctrine, for example, did so without citing any “actual
evidence that investors or markets were unaffected by vague
statements of corporate optimism.”26 Second, courts deploy litigation
heuristics to dismiss cases at an early stage—on a motion to dismiss or
for summary judgment—as a matter of law.27 The independent
physician heuristic allows courts to dismiss at an early stage failureto-warn personal injury suits, in which a manufacturer need only warn
the independent physician of the risks of a drug or device, and
economic injury suits brought by third-party payers and others, in
which the independent physician breaks the causal chain between a
manufacturer’s product promotion and the payer’s obligation to pay
for prescription drugs and devices.
22. Id. at 973.
23. Id. at 976.
24. Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody
Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 118 (2002).
25. See id. at 118–38.
26. Id. at 120–21.
27. Id. at 118.
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Courts that adopt the independent physician heuristic describe
doctors and their decision making process as follows. First, doctors
make informed decisions.28 While they may be exposed to a “drug
manufacturer’s promotions and literature[,]” they learn about drugs
and devices through multiple sources, including medical journals,
medical meetings, and their peers.29 Second, doctors make
individualized decisions about the risks and benefits a drug or device
poses for a particular patient.30 While a manufacturer is charged with
knowing what there is to know about its drug or device,31 the decision
to prescribe or not rests with the physician, who has “knowledge of
both patient and palliative.”32 Finally, and most importantly, doctors
make independent decisions.33 The Eleventh Circuit has concluded
that, “when a [physician] prescribes a drug, he presumably does so
only if, in the exercise of his independent medical judgment, he
believes the drug will benefit his patient.”34 The physician’s
independence is presumed because, as Paul Rheingold explains,
“[m]edical ethics as well as medical practice dictate independent
judgment, unaffected by the manufacturer’s control, on the part of the
doctor.”35
This Article poses the question whether and, if so, at what stage of
litigation courts should consider the possibility that a physician’s
prescribing decision might not have been informed, individualized, or
independent. Part I of the Article reviews the empirical evidence
linking financial relationships to conscious and (perhaps more often)
unconscious bias. Part II addresses plaintiffs’ largely unsuccessful
efforts to carve out a conflicts of interest cause of action, while Parts
28. Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974) (“The [prescription] choice [the
physician] makes is an informed one, an individualized medical judgment bottomed on a knowledge of
both patient and palliative.”).
29. Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharm., LP, 634 F.3d 1352, 1362–63 (11th Cir. 2011).
30. See Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1276.
31. Kate Greenwood, The Mysteries of Pregnancy: The Role of Law in Solving the Problem of Unkown
but Knowable Maternal—Fetal Medication Risk, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 267, 300–01 (2010).
32. Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1276.
33. See Ironworkers Local Union 68, 634 F.3d at 1362.
34. Id.
35. Paul D. Rheingold, Products Liability—The Ethical Drug Manufacturer’s Liability, 18 RUTGERS
L. REV. 947, 987 (1964).
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III and IV analyze the role played by the independent physician
heuristic in pharmaceutical and medical device cases, in which
plaintiffs allege personal and economic injury respectively.
Part V provides an overview of federal and state regulation of
physician-industry relationships, paying particular attention to the
significant gaps that exist, and then makes the argument that private
lawsuits brought by patients and third-party payers could, consistent
with at least a strand of current doctrine, fill some of the gaps in the
regulation of physician conflicts. In personal injury cases, courts can
move beyond the independent physician litigation heuristic by
engaging in a fact-based analysis of not just whether a financial
relationship affected a physician’s decision to prescribe a drug or
device but also whether the defendant drug or device company
intended the relationship to have such an effect. The latter inquiry is
more straightforward than the former, which could work to plaintiffs’
advantage, and it is equally relevant to the question whether the
learned intermediary doctrine should apply. In economic injury cases,
courts can move beyond the heuristic by allowing plaintiffs to use
standard statistical methods to demonstrate that physicians’
prescribing decisions were not independent in the aggregate. These
incremental moves would bring closer the goal of ensuring that
patients and payers are fairly compensated for the harms caused by
conflicts of interest. They would also provide an additional incentive
to drug and device companies to ensure that the payments they make
to physicians are legitimate.
I. FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIPS, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, AND
CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS BIAS
Financial relationships between physicians and the life sciences
industry have been the subject of interest and activity because of
concern that they subject physicians to a conflict of interest.36 In its
36. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6002, 124 Stat. 119,
689–96 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7h) (amending Part A of Title XI of the Social
Security Act by adding section 1128G and requiring pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers to
disclose payments made to physicians and teaching hospitals for, among other things, conducting clinical
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2009 report, Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, Education, and
Practice, the Institute of Medicine defined “conflict of interest” as “a
set of circumstances that creates a risk that professional judgment or
actions regarding a primary interest will be unduly influenced by a
secondary interest.”37
The American College of Physicians Ethics Manual provides that
the primary interest of a physician in clinical practice is “the patient’s
welfare and best interests, whether in preventing or treating illness or
helping patients to cope with illness, disability, and death.”38
Physicians who undertake clinical research have additional primary
obligations, including ensuring the integrity of the research and
contributing to the advancement of science.39 Of course, physicians
and investigators have a host of secondary interests as well, including
earning the respect of their colleagues, advancing their careers, and
research); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24173(c)(11) (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Reg. Sess.
& 2013–2014 First Ex. Sess.) (requiring disclosure to prospective research participants of “[t]he material
financial stake or interest, if any, that the investigator or research institution has in the outcome of the
medical experiment”); Responsibility of Applicants for Promoting Objectivity in Research for which
Public Health Service Funding is Sought and Responsible Prospective Contractors, 76 Fed. Reg. 53,256,
53,293 (Aug. 25, 2011) (codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.601-50.607) (adopting “changes that expand and add
transparency to Investigators’ disclosure of Significant Financial Interests (SFIs), enhance regulatory
compliance and effective institutional oversight and management of Investigators’ financial conflicts of
interests, as well as increase the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) compliance
oversight”); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Minnesota-Based Medtronic Inc. Pays US $23.5 Million to
Settle Claims That Company Paid Kickbacks to Physicians (Dec. 12, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-civ-1623.html (announcing settlement to resolve
allegations that device maker used post-market studies and device registries as vehicles to pay physicianinvestigators kickbacks to implant the company’s pacemakers and defibrillators); Press Release, Dep’t of
Justice, Minnesota-Based St. Jude Medical Pays U.S. $16 Million to Settle Claims that Company Paid
Kickbacks to Physicians (Jan. 20, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/January/11-civ078.html (same).
37. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MEDICAL RESEARCH,
EDUCATION, AND PRACTICE 46 (Bernard Lo & Marilyn J. Field eds., 2009). Interestingly, the Murthy
court defined the relevant conflict differently, focusing on the “irreconcilabl[e] differen[ce]” between
“[t]he responsibilities of pharmaceutical companies and physicians.” Murthy v. Abbott Labs., 847 F.
Supp. 2d 958, 972 n.5 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
38. Lois Snyder, American College of Physicians Ethics Manual: Sixth Edition, 156 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 73, 75 (2012). The Ethics Manual goes on to provide that “[t]he interests of the patient
should always be promoted regardless of financial arrangements; the health care setting; or patient
characteristics, such as decision-making capacity, behavior, or social status.” Id. In addition, “[a]lthough
the physician should be fairly compensated for services rendered, a sense of duty to the patient should
take precedence over concern about compensation.” Id.
39. KATHLEEN M. BOOZANG ET AL., CTR. FOR HEALTH & PHARM. LAW & POLICY, SETON HALL
UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CLINICAL TRIAL RECRUITMENT & ENROLLMENT: A
CALL FOR INCREASED OVERSIGHT 9 (2009).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol30/iss3/3

10

Greenwood: Physician Conflicts of Interest in Court: Beyond the Independent

2014]

PHYSICIAN CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN COURT

769

financially supporting themselves and their families.40 These
secondary influences are not inherently wrong, but they can create a
risk of compromised judgment.41
A growing body of empirical evidence suggests that even seemingly
trivial “interests”—such as the pens and other reminder items that were
once ubiquitous in hospitals and doctors’ offices—can exert undue
influence.42 The most recent iteration of the Pharmaceutical Research
and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) Code on Interactions with
Healthcare Professionals prohibits the distribution of reminder items,43
but drug samples and free meals are still permitted.44 Manufacturers
spend heavily on these and many practicing physicians accept them.45
Payments from drug and device companies to doctors for, among other
things, conducting research, serving on advisory boards, and giving
promotional talks are less common, but not rare.46
A study published in 2010 by Eric Campbell and colleagues found
that the percentage of primary care and specialist physicians who
reported receiving (1) in-kind benefits such as prescription drug
samples, food and beverages, and continuing medical education, (2)
payments for professional services, and (3) reimbursements fell
significantly between 2004 and 2009.47 That said, physician-industry
relationships remained widespread in 2009, with 83.8% of the 1,891
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Deborah Korenstein, Salomeh Keyhani & Joseph S. Ross, Physician Attitudes Toward Industry:
A View Across the Specialties, 145 ARCHIVES SURGERY 570, 573, 577 (2010); see also ASS’N OF AM.
MED. COLLS., THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF INFLUENCE AND RECIPROCITY: A SYMPOSIUM 1 (2007)
(discussing a “growing body of a neurobiological and psychosocial evidence related to the effects of gifts
on recipients’ choices and decisions”).
43. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., CODE ON INTERACTIONS WITH HEALTHCARE
PROFESSIONALS 11 (2008).
44. Id. at 4–5, 12.
45. Korenstein, Keyhani & Ross, supra note 42, at 570; see also L. Lewis Wall & Douglas Brown,
The High Cost of Free Lunch, 110 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 169, 171 (2007) (noting that “[t]he
provision of food is an especially powerful tool in shaping perceptions and increasing the sense of
reciprocal obligation in cultures around the world”); Stephanie Saul, Drug Makers Pay for Lunch as They
Pitch, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2006, at A1 (reporting that some physicians’ offices receive breakfast and
lunch paid for by pharmaceutical companies every day and that the companies spend hundreds of millions
of dollars each year on such meals).
46. Korenstein, Keyhani & Ross, supra note 42, at 570.
47. Eric G. Campbell et al., Physician Professionalism and Changes in Industry Relationships From
2004 to 2009, 170 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1820, 1823 (2010).
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physicians the authors surveyed reporting a relationship of some type
within the previous year. More specifically, 70.8% of the physicians
surveyed received gifts (“primarily food and beverages in their
offices”) from industry, 63.8% received drug samples, 18.3% received
“reimbursements for meetings or free or subsidized admission to CME
meetings,” and 14.1% were paid for their professional services.48 The
authors broke the final category down even further, explaining that
“payments for speaking engagements were most frequent (8.6% of all
respondents), followed by serving as a consultant (6.7%), service on a
company advisory board (4.6%), and payments in excess of costs for
enrolling patients in clinical trials (1.2%).”49
In a study published in 2013, Campbell and colleagues further
analyzed the data from their 2009 survey and found that physicians
who accepted food and beverages from industry were significantly
more likely to acquiesce to a patient’s request for a brand-name
medication over an available generic than were physicians who did not
accept food and beverages.50 Physicians who received drug samples
were also significantly more likely to comply with their patients’
requests for brand-name medications.51
Several widely cited studies from the early 1990s also support the
common sense conclusion that drug and device companies would not
“spend large sums of money on marketing efforts if they were not felt
to be effective.”52 A 1990 survey study of physicians at seven teaching
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Eric G. Campbell et al., Physician Acquiescence to Patient Demands for Brand-Name Drugs:
Results of a National Survey of Physicians, 173 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 237, 237–38 (2013).
51. Id.
52. James P. Orlowski & Leon Wateska, The Effects of Pharmaceutical Firm Enticements on
Physician Prescribing Patterns: There’s No Such Thing as a Free Lunch, 102 CHEST 270, 273 (1992).
Studies of physicians’ financial relationships unrelated to the pharmaceutical and medical device
industries provide further support for the conclusion that secondary interests can influence physician
decision making. See, e.g., David Orentlicher, Cost Containment and the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, 6 FLA. INT’L UNIV. L. REV. 67, 72 (2010) (“[W]hen physicians are paid a salary, [as
opposed to being paid on a fee-for-service basis,] they are less likely to order lab tests, request radiologic
scans or perform surgeries.”); Christopher Robertson, Susannah Rose & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Effect of
Financial Relationships on the Behaviors of Health Care Professionals: A Review of the Evidence, 40 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 452, 462 (2012) (“Our review has found evidence that financial relationships bias
physician decisions to different degrees in all three areas we explored: the payments to referrers, the
incentives created by health insurers, and the largesse provided by the drug and device industries.”).
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hospitals found a correlation between a report of receipt of a free meal
and a report of a change in practice.53 The same study found a
correlation between receipt of honoraria or research support and
requests that drugs be added to the hospitals’ formularies.54 A 1994
study compared forty physicians who requested that drugs be added to
their hospitals’ formularies with eighty physicians who did not and
found that accepting money from companies to attend or speak at
educational symposia or to perform research was strongly correlated
with requesting a formulary addition.55
A third study, published in 1992, compared physicians’ prescribing
of two drugs before and after the physicians and their guests went on
all-expenses-paid trips to resorts where they attended symposia on the
drugs.56 The physicians’ usage of both drugs increased sharply as soon
as the invitations to attend the symposia were extended.57 The study
authors concluded that “[t]he temporal relationship to the expense-paid
seminar is difficult to ignore and the two-to three-fold increase in
prescribed units is impressive.”58 The authors also noted that there
“was no discernible change in the prescribing of the alternative drugs
which these new drugs were designed to replace, suggesting that the
new drugs were not replacing older alternatives, but instead that the
enticements were resulting in additional and perhaps excessive use.”59
There is also ample anecdotal evidence that financial relationships
between doctors and drug and device companies are intended to—and
do—influence physician decision making. Michael Oldani, a former
pharmaceutical sales representative who is now an anthropologist,
describes an episode “during one of [his] last years with Company X”
when he was “quite desperate to make ‘quota’ (i.e., feeling managerial
pressure in form of performance reviews to match or exceed the
53. Nicole Lurie et al., Pharmaceutical Representatives in Academic Medical Centers: Interaction
with Faculty and Housestaff, 5 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 240, 240 (1990).
54. Id.
55. Mary-Margaret Chren & C. Seth Landefeld, Physicians’ Behavior and Their Interactions with
Drug Companies: A Controlled Study of Physicians Who Requested Additions to a Hospital Drug
Formulary, 271 JAMA 684, 684 (1994).
56. Orlowski & Wateska, supra note 52, at 270.
57. Id. at 271.
58. Id. at 273.
59. Id.
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previous year’s sales) for a hospital-based IV antibiotic, Antibiotic
S.”60 Oldani created gift cards good for ten free cups of coffee at the
hospital coffee cart and gave them out to “anyone who could write a
prescription of Antibiotic S.”61 The result was sales of Antibiotic S that
“far exceeded” Oldani’s expectations, allowing him to achieve his
sales quota.62
Court documents released by the Department of Justice in July 2012
tell a similar story. In 2000 and 2001, GlaxoSmithKline allegedly
promoted its anti-depressant Paxil to psychiatrists during “Paxil
Forum” meetings held at “lavish” resorts.63 In addition to being
reimbursed for all of his or her expenses, each psychiatrist who
attended was paid a $750 honorarium; psychiatrists who spoke at the
meetings were paid $2,500.64 An internal memorandum prepared after
the 2000 Paxil Forum meeting reported that “[p]hysicians grew actual
market share versus their forecasted share immediately after Forum
attendance,” and noted that “[t]est physicians grew market share
significantly relative to Control physicians.”65 According to the
memorandum, the 2000 Paxil Forum meetings “resulted in at least
$900,000 in additional revenue in 2000 alone.”66
Importantly, individuals are often not conscious of the bias caused
by a conflict of interest.67 Writing in 2003, Jason Dana and George
60. Michael J. Oldani, Thick Prescriptions: Toward an Interpretation of Pharmaceutical Sales
Practices, 18 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 325, 334 (2004).
61. Id. at 335.
62. Id.
63. United States’ Complaint at 17, United States ex rel. Thorpe v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, No. 1110398-RWZ (D. Mass. Oct. 26, 2011).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 18–19.
66. Id. at 19.
67. See, e.g., Ann H. Harvey, Ulrich Kirk, George H. Denfield & P. Read Montague, Monetary Favors
and Their Influence on Neural Responses and Revealed Preference, 30 J. NEUROSCIENCE 9597, 9600–01
(2010) (reporting on research demonstrating that “[a] monetary favor from a company was indeed capable
of robustly influencing preference for art paired with the logo of the sponsoring company logo. . . . despite
the fact that subjects were unfamiliar with the company logos, subjects had no reciprocal interaction with
the company, and the only association between the art and the sponsoring company was visual
juxtaposition on a computer screen,” and despite the fact that the subjects of the research did not believe
“the presence of the logo influenced their ability to judge the paintings”); see also Azgad Gold & Paul S.
Appelbaum, Unconscious Conflict of Interest: A Jewish Perspective, 37 J. MED. ETHICS 402, 404 (2011)
(“It seems that the Talmudic answer to this question is clear. On the psychological level, one cannot escape
the deleterious unconscious effects of receiving a gift. As a human being, the recipient is biased, no matter
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Loewenstein drew the following conclusions from social science
research on conflicts of interest:
First, individuals are unable to remain objective, even when they
are motivated to be impartial, demonstrating that self-serving bias
is unintentional. Second, individuals deny and succumb to bias
even when explicitly instructed about it, which suggests that selfserving bias is unconscious. Third, the studies show that selfinterest affects choices indirectly, changing the way individuals
seek out and weigh the information on which they later base their
choices when they have a stake in the outcomes.68

Many doctors concede that even small financial interests may have
the potential to influence the judgment of other physicians, but deny
that they themselves would be affected. For example, a study
published in 2010 found that 52% of the physicians surveyed believed
that their colleagues were likely to be biased by free food or gifts, while
only 36% thought they themselves would be biased; a number of prior
surveys have reached similar conclusions.69 Other studies have shown
that “[r]eceiving a gift and the number of gifts received correlated with
the belief that pharmaceutical representatives have no impact on
prescribing behavior.”70 That conflicts of interest work at a
subconscious level raises the concern that it may be difficult for
how wise and otherwise reasonable the person may be.”); Don A. Moore, Philip E. Tetlock, Lloyd Tanlu
& Max H. Bazerman, Conflicts of Interest and the Case of Auditor Independence: Moral Seduction and
Strategic Issue Cycling, 31 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (arguing that, with specific regard to auditors,
“[p]utting the most Machiavellian fringes of professional communities aside, . . . the majority of
professionals are unaware of the gradual accumulation of pressures on them to slant their conclusions—a
process we characterize as moral seduction”).
68. Jason Dana & George Loewenstein, A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to Physicians from
Industry, 290 JAMA 252, 253 (2003).
69. Korenstein, Keyhani & Ross, supra note 42, at 573; see also Kirsten E. Austad, Jerry Avorn &
Aaron S. Kesselheim, Medical Students’ Exposure to and Attitudes About the Pharmaceutical Industry:
A Systematic Review, 8 PLOS MED., May 24, 2011, at 3 (“In most studies, almost two-thirds of students
reported that they were immune to bias induced by promotion . . . , gifts . . . , or interactions with sales
representatives in general . . . . This perception of immunity to bias was prevalent in both the preclinical
and clinical years. It appeared that students were more likely to report that fellow medical students . . . or
doctors . . . are influenced by such encounters than they were personally . . . .”).
70. Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?, 283
JAMA 373, 375–76 (2000).
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physicians to determine for themselves when the risk that a secondary
interest could unduly influence their professional judgment or actions
has become a reality.
II. A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PHYSICIAN CONFLICTS OF INTEREST?
Patients and research participants have tried with little success to
sue physicians and pharmaceutical and medical device companies for
conflicts of interest qua conflicts of interest.71 The Minnesota Court of
Appeals’ 1997 decision in D.A.B. v. Brown exemplifies the
difficulties.72 In that case, the plaintiffs, a putative class of minor
patients and their parents, sued a physician, Dr. David A. Brown, a
drug manufacturer, Genentech, and a drug distributor, Caremark,
alleging that the defendants failed to disclose a kickback scheme
involving the drug Protropin, a synthetic form of human growth
hormone.73
Before the plaintiffs filed their civil suit, Dr. Brown, Caremark, and
four individual defendants, who were executives at Caremark and
Genentech, had been indicted on multiple counts of mail fraud, wire
fraud, and money laundering.74 They were also charged with violating
the federal anti-kickback law, which makes it a felony to offer or pay,
or to solicit or receive, “any remuneration (including any kickback,
bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in
kind” for, among other things, “purchasing, leasing, ordering, or
arranging for or recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any
good, facility, service, or item for which payment may be made in
whole or in part under a Federal health care program.”75 The
71. Gatter, supra note 2, at 376.
72. D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
73. Id. at 169.
74. Id.
75. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1) & (2) (2006). As David Hyman explains, the anti-kickback law
has “statutory exceptions for discounts, payments pursuant to a bona fide employment relationship, group
purchasing organizations, waiver of coinsurance obligations, and risk-sharing agreements of managed
care organizations,” as well as “administrative regulations creating specific safe harbors and advisory
opinions covering a number of other arrangements.” David A. Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse:
Market Change, Social Norms, and the Trust “Reposed in the Workmen”, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 531, 534–
35 (2001).
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government alleged that Dr. Brown “solicited and received payments
from Caremark, . . . [which] was the exclusive home health distributor
of . . . Protropin, in exchange for Brown’s referral of patients for whom
he prescribed Protropin and who were participants in the Medicaid
program.”76
Caremark pled guilty to a single count of mail fraud and entered into
a plea agreement in which it “stipulated that it made payments to [Dr.
Brown] to induce him to refer patients for Protropin-related services
and supplies.”77 Caremark “agreed to pay a total of $161 million in
fines, penalties, and restitution.”78 The remaining defendants went to
trial. The district court granted the defendant executives’ motions for
judgments of acquittal at the close of the government’s case.79 Dr.
Brown was found guilty of two of the nineteen counts submitted
against him but was granted a new trial based on juror misconduct and
the jury’s exposure to the fact of Caremark’s guilty plea.80
Because the anti-kickback law does not have a private right of
action, the plaintiffs in D.A.B. were in need of a legal theory. They
sued for “breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy to breach that duty,
common law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the
Minnesota Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act.”81 The court rejected
the plaintiffs’ claim under the Consumer Fraud Act for failure to plead
a cognizable injury. While the complaint included “a general
allegation that the patients and their parents ‘have been harmed’ by the
kickback scheme[,]” this was insufficient.82 The court suggested that
the complaint might have survived the motion to dismiss had the
plaintiffs been able to allege (1) that they had to pay more for Protropin
than they would have for another drug, (2) that they had to pay more
in premiums or insurance co-payments as a result of the Protropin they
were prescribed, and/or (3) that they “would have stopped Protropin
treatment or purchased another drug if the doctor had disclosed the
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
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kickback scheme.”83
The D.A.B. court also rejected the plaintiffs’ common law claims.
In the words of the court, the plaintiffs asked the court to “apply[]
traditional fiduciary concepts” to put “teeth” into physicians’ duty to
provide “medical opinions about treatment plans and referrals
unsullied by conflicting motives.”84 A breach of fiduciary duty claim
has “teeth” because, at least in some jurisdictions, a plaintiff need only
prove that the defendant breached a fiduciary relationship to make out
a prima facie case.85 As the court explained, “‘injury’ would be
presumed, due to the nature of the fiduciary relationship, and a
fiduciary could be required to disgorge itself of all profits gained as a
result of the breach.”86
Although the D.A.B. court agreed with the plaintiffs “that a
physician’s advice about treatment options should be free from selfserving financial considerations,” the court determined that “the
gravamen of the complaint sound[ed] in medical malpractice[,]” not
breach of fiduciary duty.87 A breach of fiduciary duty claim, the court
suggested, might be available where the underlying facts are
independent of medical diagnosis, treatment, and care.88 That was not
the case in D.A.B. because Dr. Brown’s treatment of his pediatric
patients with Protropin was at the heart of the defendants’ kickback
scheme.89
The court’s rejection of the breach of fiduciary duty claim posed a
problem for the plaintiffs for two reasons. First, as is the case in many
or most states, the statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions
in Minnesota is very short. The events alleged in the complaint
occurred outside of the two-year statute of limitations period for
medical malpractice actions but within the six-year statute of
limitations for breaches of fiduciary duty.90 The second, and more
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id. at 170.
Gatter, supra note 2, at 379.
D.A.B., 570 N.W.2d at 172.
Id. at 171–72.
Id. at 171.
Id.
Id.
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fundamental, problem is that, to adequately plead a medical
malpractice claim, a plaintiff must allege that the physician’s breach
of the standard of care caused the plaintiff to suffer an injury.91 The
plaintiffs in D.A.B., however, did “not allege the Protropin treatment
was improper or that the treatment resulted in harm.”92
As Robert Gatter has explained, even when a patient or research
participant is able to allege cognizable harm, to prevail on a medical
malpractice or other negligence-based claim, they still bear “the
burden of proving causation, which, in a case alleging injury as a result
of a financial conflict of interest, means proving a financial motive
underlying the defendant’s conduct.”93 An injured plaintiff must
“establish that, but for the conflict of interest, the [defendant] would
have conducted himself or herself in a way that avoided injury to the
plaintiff.”94 In Gatter’s view, this “burden is almost impossible to
satisfy.”95
In the main, courts have held, as the Minnesota Court of Appeals
did in D.A.B., that claims for breach of fiduciary duty do not lie against
physicians for their conflicts of interest. Courts have likewise held that
such claims do not lie against health plans for the conflicts created by
their financial arrangements with physicians. In Pegram v. Herdrich,
the plaintiff was enrolled in a health maintenance organization (HMO)
that paid its physician owners a “year-end distribution” equal to “the
profit resulting from their own decisions rationing care.”96 The
plaintiff argued that the provision of medical services under those
terms “entailed an inherent or anticipatory breach of an [Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)] fiduciary duty,
since these terms created an incentive to make decisions in the
physicians’ self-interest, rather than the exclusive interests of plan

91. Id.
92. D.A.B., 570 N.W.2d at 171.
93. Gatter, supra note 2, at 377.
94. Id.
95. Id. But see Martinez v. Elias, 922 N.E.2d 457, 465–66 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (affirming, in case in
which the jury found for the plaintiff, trial court’s admission of evidence of a surgeon’s financial incentive
to perform surgery in support of the plaintiff’s claim that the surgery performed was unnecessary).
96. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 220 (2000).

Published by Reading Room, 2014

19

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 3

778

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:3

participants.”97
The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim, explaining that an
HMO’s defense against a breach of fiduciary duty claim “would be
that its physician did not act out of financial interest but for good
medical reasons, the plausibility of which would require reference to
standards of reasonable and customary medical practices in like
circumstances.”98 This, in turn, would mean that “every claim of
fiduciary breach by an HMO physician . . . would boil down to a
malpractice claim, and the fiduciary standard would be nothing but the
malpractice standard traditionally applied in actions against
physicians.”99 Congress, the Court held, did not enact ERISA in order
to “federalize malpractice litigation.”100 The Court also observed that
if claims like the plaintiff’s were permitted to proceed, “[i]t would be
so easy to allege, and to find, an economic influence when sparing care
did not lead to a well patient, that any such standard in practice would
allow a factfinder to convert an HMO into a guarantor of recovery.”101
In a small number of cases, plaintiffs have been permitted to pursue
claims arising out of a physician’s failure to disclose that he or she had
a conflict of interest.102 In the leading case, Moore v. The Regents of
the University of California, the plaintiff sued the doctor who treated
97. Id. at 216.
98. Id. at 235.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 236.
101. Id. at 234–35. While Pegram is an ERISA case, its reasoning applies as well to common law
breach of fiduciary duty claims. Gatter, supra note 2, at 381. In Neade v. Portes, for example, the Illinois
Supreme Court adopted the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in Pegram in dismissing a common
law breach of fiduciary duty claim brought against a physician. Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496, 501–02
(Ill. 2000).
102. See, e.g., Garcia v. Coffman, 946 P.2d 216, 219, 221, 226 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding jury
award of $2 in nominal damages and $50,000 in punitive damages against chiropractor who failed to
disclose “a scheme to generate income through the provision of unnecessary medical services”); Minute
Order at 1–2, McDonald v. UCSD Med. Ctr., No. 37-2009-00088181-CU-PO-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct.
7, 2011), 2011 WL 9517594 (“There is a triable issue of fact whether Dr. Kim should have disclosed his
financial relationship with HydroCision and his use of off-label equipment or materials . . . . Dr. Kim
admits he had a consulting relationship with HydroCision, used a HydroCision product, a SpineJet
Resector, during [the plaintiff’s] surgery and received royalties for certain purchases of the
product. . . . Although defendants contend the financial interest was de minimus [sic] and off-label use is
permitted, the scope of the physician’s communications to the patient are measured by the materiality to
the patient’s decision. Thus, there is a triable issue whether the financial relationship and off-label use
should have been disclosed to plaintiff.” (citations omitted)).
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him for hairy-cell leukemia, alleging that the doctor withdrew the
plaintiff’s spleen as well as “blood, bone marrow aspirate, and other
bodily substances” without disclosing that the doctor planned to use
the plaintiff’s cells in potentially lucrative clinical research.103 In
addition to his doctor, the plaintiff sued the Regents of the University
of California (the owners of the hospital where the plaintiff was
treated) and a researcher employed by the Regents, as well as a
pharmaceutical company and another for-profit entity that entered into
an agreement with the plaintiff’s doctor to commercialize the
plaintiff’s cells.104
The California Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s breach of
fiduciary duty claim against his doctor could proceed. Specifically, the
court found that “a physician who is seeking a patient’s consent for a
medical procedure must, in order to satisfy his fiduciary duty and to
obtain the patient’s informed consent, disclose personal interests
unrelated to the patient’s health, whether research or economic, that
may affect his medical judgment.”105 In deciding on a course of
treatment, the court explained, a reasonable patient would want to
know whether “an interest extraneous to the patient’s health has
affected the physician’s judgment.”106 The plaintiff did not, however,
have a claim against the other four defendants, except “on account of
[the doctor]’s acts and on the basis of a recognized theory of secondary

103. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 480–83 (Cal. 1990).
104. Id. at 480–81.
105. Id. at 485.
106. Id. at 484. The California Supreme Court’s holding in Moore reflects the fact that California has
adopted the “reasonable patient” informed consent standard under which physicians must “provide the
information a reasonable patient would deem material.” Nadia N. Sawicki, The Abortion Informed
Consent Debate: More Light, Less Heat, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 19 (2011). Most states instead
apply a “reasonable physician” standard under which “the physician would be liable . . . if . . . she failed
to disclose the information her colleagues customarily disclose.” Id.; see also 5 Med. Malpractice
(Matthew Bender) § 22.05 (2013) (reporting that the reasonable patient standard “remains the minority
position”). In states using the reasonable physician standard, a physician would only be required to
disclose “an interest extraneous to the patient’s health” if other physicians customarily did so. Moore, 793
P.2d at 484. Moreover, even in California, in the managed care context, a statute specifically states that
health care providers need not supply information about “financial bonuses or any other incentives,”
unless a person so requests, and that providers may withhold “privileged or confidential” financial
information. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.10(b) (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Reg. Sess.
& 2013–2014 First Ex. Sess.).
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liability, such as respondeat superior.”107
The facts of Moore are plainly unusual. In a subsequent case
involving a more typical physician-industry financial relationship,
Dimmick v. United States, a Northern District of California court
distinguished Moore as follows:
Unlike the physician in Moore, Dr. Lampiris[, the plaintiff’s
doctor,] was not participating in research involving ritonavir[, the
drug at issue], nor did he derive any financial benefit by including
ritonavir in Dimmick’s[, the plaintiff’s] drug regimen. Rather, Dr.
Lampiris received fixed compensation for his consultant work,
unlike the physician in Moore who received compensation in
exchange for administering treatment. Finally, Dr. Lampiris’
testimony that, in prescribing ritonavir as a component of
Dimmick’s regimen, his professional judgment was unaffected by
his role as a consultant for Abbott[, ritonavir’s manufacturer,]
went unrebutted.108

The Dimmick court went on to find that even if the plaintiff had been
able to establish that a reasonable patient would want to know about
the defendant physician’s consulting work, the plaintiff would not be
able to make the—in Gatter’s estimation “almost impossible”109—
causation showing.110 That is, he would not be able to show “that a
prudent person would not have taken the ritonavir in light of Dr.
Lampiris’ role as a consultant for Abbott.”111
In Wright v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center, the plaintiffs—the
estates and surviving relatives of cancer patients who died while
participating in a clinical trial—were similarly unsuccessful.112 The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants—the Fred Hutchinson Cancer
107. Moore, 793 P.2d at 486.
108. Dimmick v. United States, No. C 05-0971 PJH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90843, at *55 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 15, 2006).
109. Gatter, supra note 2, at 377.
110. Dimmick, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90843, at *56.
111. Id. at *57.
112. Wright v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Ctr., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1291, 1297 (W.D. Wash.
2002).
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Research Center and researchers there—violated the plaintiffs’ rights
by failing to disclose that the defendants had a financial conflict of
interest.113 According to an exposé in the Seattle Times, the Fred
Hutchinson Cancer Research Center had licensed its intellectual
property rights in the treatment being studied to a start-up company
called Genetic Systems.114 The Center retained a royalty interest in the
treatment and both the Center and the researchers held equity in
Genetic Systems.115
The District Court for the Western District of Washington allowed
the plaintiffs’ state law fraud and informed consent claims to proceed
to trial in state court.116 Before the trial concluded, however, the judge
“threw out” the fraud claim, “ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to
prove a financial conflict.”117 The informed consent claim went to the
jury, which found for the defendants.118 Interviews with jurors after
the verdict was issued suggested that the plaintiffs were not able to
show that if they had known about the defendants’ financial conflicts
of interest they would not have consented to participate in the clinical
trial.119
Finally, in another significant case, Darke v. Isner, a Massachusetts
Superior Court held that a claim did lie against a conflicted hospital
and physician-investigator for gross negligence and deceit.120 The
plaintiff in the case was the widow of a man who died while
participating in an experimental gene therapy program.121 She alleged
that her husband would not have elected to participate in the program
if he had known that, should the therapy being studied prove effective,
113. Id. at 1297.
114. Duff Wilson & David Heath, The Blood-Cancer Experiment: Patients Never Knew the Full
Danger of Trials They Staked Their Lives On, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, at A1. Note that the Center
denied Wilson and Heath’s allegations. See Q & A on This Series: Questions and Answers About ‘The
Hutch’, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 25, 2001), http://seattletimes.com/uninformed_consent/qa.html.
115. Wilson & Heath, supra note 114, at A15.
116. See David Heath & Luke Timmerman, Jury Finds Hutch Not Negligent in 4 Deaths, SEATTLE
TIMES, Apr. 9, 2004, at A1, A15.
117. Id. at A15.
118. Id. at A1.
119. Id. at A15.
120. Darke v. Estate of Isner, No. 02-2194, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 250, at *10 (Mass. Super. Ct.
June 3, 2004).
121. Id. at *1.
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both the hospital and the physician “stood to profit financially in
proportion to their ownership stake” in a company called Vascular
Genetics that the physician helped to found.122
In a May 2005 decision, the superior court denied a defense motion
for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s gross negligence claim,
holding that enough evidence had been presented to support the
allegation that the physician-investigator’s financial stake in the
success of the treatment being studied may have compromised how the
clinical trial was conducted.123 The court also held that there was
sufficient evidence to go forward with the deceit claim for failure to
disclose the financial relationships to the plaintiff and her late
husband.124 The jury, however, rejected the plaintiff’s claims on the
merits,125 providing further support for the conclusion that the burden
of causation in such cases is “almost impossible to satisfy.”126
III. PHYSICIAN-INDUSTRY RELATIONSHIPS IN PHARMACEUTICAL AND
MEDICAL DEVICE PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS
Moving on from the largely unsuccessful efforts of patients and
research participants to sue physicians and others for conflicts qua
conflicts, physician-industry financial relationships also play a role—
a contested one—in pharmaceutical and medical device personal
injury actions. The Restatement (Third) of Torts provides that the
manufacturer of a prescription drug or medical device is subject to
liability for harm caused by a defect in the drug or device. A drug or
device is defective if it “(1) contains a manufacturing defect . . . ; or
(2) is not reasonably safe due to defective design . . . ; or (3) is not
reasonably safe due to inadequate instructions or warnings . . . .”127
Most personal injury claims brought by patients and research
122. Id. at *3–4.
123. Darke v. Estate of Isner, No. 02-2194-E, 2005 Mass. Super. LEXIS 663, at *15–17 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Nov. 15, 2005).
124. Id. at *25.
125. Jury Verdict, Darke v. Estate of Isner, No. 02-2194-E (Mass. Super. Ct. May 4, 2007), 2007 WL
2219825.
126. Gatter, supra note 2, at 377.
127. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(b) (1998).
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participants against drug and device manufacturers are failure-to-warn
claims that fall into the third category.128
The default rule in products liability cases is that a manufacturer has
a duty to warn the “ordinary user” of the manufacturer’s product’s
risks and provide instruction on the product’s proper use.129 Under the
learned intermediary doctrine,130 however, drug and device
manufacturers can discharge this duty by warning and instructing
prescribers.131 When the doctrine applies, a plaintiff must show two
things to make out a failure-to-warn claim: (1) that the warning was
inadequate or misleading; and (2) that an adequate warning would
have altered the physician’s prescribing decision.132 Put differently,
the inadequate or misleading warning must “be a ‘producing cause’ of
the plaintiff’s injuries.”133 If, for example, a manufacturer failed to
warn of a foreseeable risk of harm but the physician independently
knew of the risk, the manufacturer would not be liable.
The Restatement provides that the learned intermediary doctrine
applies unless a manufacturer “knows or has reason to know that
health-care providers will not be in a position to reduce the risks of
harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings.”134 It is here that
the significance of physician-industry relationships is debated, as
plaintiffs contend that conflicts so undermine physicians’ ability to
make unbiased risk-benefit calculations that manufacturers should be
required to warn patients directly.
A. The Learned Intermediary Doctrine in Theory and in Practice
A number of justifications have been offered for the learned
128. The Restatement defines defective design extremely narrowly to include only those drugs or
devices “that reasonable health-care providers, knowing of [the product’s] foreseeable risks and
therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe . . . for any class of patients.” Id. § 6(c).
129. Valentine v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 252, 263 (Ct. App. 1999).
130. The learned intermediary doctrine was first mentioned by name in 1966. Sterling Drug, Inc. v.
Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966).
131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(d)(1).
132. Id. § 6(d)(1)–(2).
133. Patteson v. AstraZeneca, LP, 876 F. Supp. 2d 27, 34 (D.D.C. 2012).
134. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(d)(2); see also Ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion
for Directed Verdict on Defendant’s Learned Intermediary Doctrine Defense, In re Vioxx Cases, No.
JCCP 4247 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2006), 2006 WL 6305292.
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intermediary doctrine.135 In an early case decided in 1973, Gravis v.
Parke-Davis, a Texas appellate court explained that it was applying
the doctrine because physicians and other prescribers are in “the best
position to evaluate the warnings put out by the drug industry.”136 The
Gravis court also relied on its belief that, “[g]enerally speaking, only
a physician would understand the propensities and dangers
involved.”137 Finally, the court emphasized, “[t]he entire system of
drug distribution in America is set up so as to place the responsibility
of distribution and use upon professional people.”138 In Taurino v.
Ellen, decided in 1990, a Pennsylvania appellate court elaborated on
the third point, finding that warning patients directly was not necessary
because each prescribing physician has a duty “to be fully aware of (1)
the characteristics of the drug he is prescribing, (2) the amount of the
drug which can be safely administered, and (3) the different
medications the patient is taking” as well as “to advise the patient of
any dangers or side effects associated with the use of the drug as well
as how and when to take the drug.”139 Finally, in 1999 in Perez v.
Wyeth Laboratories, the New Jersey Supreme Court listed several
other justifications for the doctrine (all of which, it concluded, no
longer obtained).140 These included “(1) reluctance to undermine the
doctor patient-relationship; (2) absence in the era of ‘doctor knows
best’ of need for the patient’s informed consent; [and the] (3) inability
of drug manufacturer to communicate with patients . . . .”141
The learned intermediary doctrine has also been justified as an
135. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. b.
136. Gravis v. Parke-Davis & Co., 502 S.W.2d 863, 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(d)(1) (providing that the doctrine applies where the prescriber is “in
a position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings”).
137. Gravis, 502 S.W.2d at 870.
138. Id.
139. Taurino v. Ellen, 579 A.2d 925, 927 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (quoting Makripodis v. Merrell-Dow
Pharms., Inc., 523 A.2d 374, 378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)).
140. Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1255 (N.J. 1999). With regard to the third justification,
Lars Noah has explained that “[u]nlike [over-the-counter] products, pharmacists usually dispense
prescription drugs from bulk containers rather than as unit-of-use packages in which the manufacturer
may have enclosed labeling.” Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers: Assessing the
Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141, 158 (1997). The Perez court concluded that
manufacturers could nonetheless communicate directly with patients, citing in support the rise of directto-consumer advertising. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255–56.
141. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255.
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instantiation of the proximate cause requirement. In a 2012 Eastern
District of Pennsylvania case, the court accepted the defendant’s
argument that the learned intermediary doctrine required that the
plaintiff’s claim under Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) be dismissed because, the court
explained, “the UTPCPL requires proof of causation and reliance.”142
A physician or other prescriber “‘breaks the chain in terms of
reliance,’” because even if a drug or device manufacturer failed to
warn a patient adequately, “‘the patient cannot obtain prescription
drugs without the physician no matter what [the patient] believe[s]
about them.’”143
While the learned intermediary doctrine does not self-evidently
favor plaintiffs or defendants, it is manufacturers that seek its
protection and patients and research participants who argue that
exceptions should be made to it. This no doubt results from the fact
that, if the doctrine applies, the deep-pocketed drug or device company
is likely to escape liability. As Lars Noah has explained:
The ‘learned intermediary’ rule has important consequences for
litigation. . . . Typically, physicians will concede that they
understood the relevant risk information as contrasted with the
likely testimony of the plaintiff that any warning communicated
directly to them seemed less than fully adequate. Moreover,
plaintiffs would have to introduce expert testimony to support any
inadequacy claim, vis-a-vis physician labeling, as contrasted with
a consumer-directed warning to which juries could apply their
common sense.144

When the doctrine applies, a plaintiff will often be unable make out
a failure-to-warn claim. The plaintiff’s physician will testify that he or
she was aware that the side effects experienced by the plaintiff could
occur and that the physician prescribed the drug at issue anyway,
142. Kee v. Zimmer, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 405, 411 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
143. Id. (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
144. Lars Noah, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: A Sensible Duty Limitation or an Anachronism?,
10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 98, 99 (2000).
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because it was the right choice for the plaintiff. Unless it is
contradicted, the physician’s testimony makes it impossible for the
plaintiff to show that the cause of his or her injuries was the
manufacturer’s failure-to-warn the physician. In the words of Judge
Jack B. Weinstein, the learned intermediary doctrine “cannot be
viewed as an all-or-nothing regulation that absolves the manufacturer,
shifting the onus entirely to the treating physician, but its force in
ameliorating liability for damages of the manufacturers cannot be
ignored.”145
B. Exceptions to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine
The “clearest and most widely accepted exception to the learned
intermediary [doctrine]”146 was made for vaccines, because they were
often administered “outside the context of a doctor-patient
relationship”147 and “without the sort of individualized medical
balancing of the risks to the vaccinee” that the doctrine
contemplates.148 While relatively uncontroversial, the exception to the
learned intermediary doctrine for vaccines is no longer operative
because the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Act provides that
[n]o vaccine manufacturer shall be liable in a civil action for
damages arising from a vaccine-related injury or death associated
with the administration of a vaccine . . . solely due to the
manufacturer’s failure to provide direct warnings to the injured
party (or the injured party’s legal representative) of the potential
dangers resulting from the administration of the vaccine
manufactured by the manufacturer.149

Less widely adopted than the exception for vaccines is the exception
for prescriptions for birth control. The Supreme Court of
145.
2007).
146.
147.
148.
149.

Souther v. Eli Lilly & Co. (In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig.), 489 F. Supp. 2d 230, 244 (E.D.N.Y.
Hall, supra note 7, at 207.
Id. at 207–08.
Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1277 (5th Cir. 1974).
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(c) (2006).
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Massachusetts adopted the exception in 1985 in MacDonald v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical.150 The court based its decision on, among other
things, the belief that “the healthy, young consumer of oral
contraceptives is usually actively involved in the decision to use ‘the
pill,’ as opposed to other available birth control products, and the
prescribing physician is relegated to a relatively passive role.”151 The
MacDonald decision broke new ground—the dissenting justice wrote
that “no other court has embraced the rule laid down today by the
court”152—and few courts have followed it.153
Also less than uniformly accepted is an exception made to the
learned intermediary doctrine when the FDA requires that a warning
be delivered directly to patients.154 This exception overlaps with the
exception for birth control because “the FDA’s extensive regulation of
contraceptive drugs and devices” includes “requirements for patient
and physician warnings with regard to intrauterine devices and birth
control pills.”155 The Restatement explains that while “[s]ome case law
supports the position that warnings should be given directly to patients
when government regulations so require . . . an equal number of
decisions reject this development.”156
An exception has also been made to the learned intermediary
doctrine where a drug has been promoted directly to consumers.157
This direct-to-consumer advertising exception overlaps with the
government-mandated direct warnings exception, because, in the
words of the Restatement, FDA “regulations require that, when drugs
are so advertised, they must be accompanied by appropriate
information concerning risk so as to provide balanced advertising.”158
The direct-to-consumer advertising exception has only been
adopted by a handful of courts, including the Supreme Court of New
150. MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 70 (Mass. 1985).
151. Id. at 69.
152. Id. at 73 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
153. Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 758, 766 (Ky. 2004) (“Virtually every other jurisdiction that has
addressed the issue has rejected an exception for oral contraceptives.”).
154. Edwards v. Basel Pharm., 933 P.2d 298, 301 (Okla. 1997).
155. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.501, 310.502 (1997)).
156. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt.e (1998).
157. See id.
158. Id.
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Jersey in Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories.159 As noted above, the Perez
court concluded that the premises underlying the learned intermediary
doctrine, which include
(1) reluctance to undermine the doctor patient-relationship; (2)
absence in the era of ‘doctor knows best’ of need for the patient’s
informed consent; (3) inability of drug manufacturer to
communicate with patients; and (4) complexity of the subject; are
all (with the possible exception of the last) absent in the direct-toconsumer advertising of prescription drugs.160

The court held
that when mass marketing of prescription drugs seeks to influence
a patient’s choice of a drug, a pharmaceutical manufacturer that
makes direct claims to consumers for the efficacy of its product
should not be unqualifiedly relieved of a duty to provide proper
warnings of the dangers or side effects of the product.161

Finally, some courts have made an exception to the learned
intermediary doctrine where the manufacturer engaged in
“overpromotion” of the product that harmed the plaintiff.162 In an
159. Accord Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1070 (8th Cir. 1989); Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 764
F. Supp. 208, 211 n.4 (D. Mass. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 976 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1992); Stephens v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379, 381 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245,
1247 (N.J. 1999); cf. Beale v. Biomet, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1376 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“While the
Perez court found that the law should be changing in response to changes in marketing strategies by drug
manufacturers, New Jersey is the only state to have done so. It is now eight years since Perez was decided,
and no other state has followed suit.”).
160. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255 (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 1247. The recognition of an exception for direct-to-consumer advertising has not been as
beneficial to plaintiffs proceeding in New Jersey or under New Jersey law as might have been expected.
See Hall, supra note 7, at 233 (“Even in New Jersey, however, recognition of this exception has not
resulted in subsequent litigation seeking to hold drug manufacturers liable for failure to warn.”). This is
in part because the Perez court also announced a rebuttable presumption that the duty to warn is satisfied
“in the area of direct-to-consumer advertising of pharmaceuticals . . . when a manufacturer complies with
FDA advertising, labeling and warning requirements.” Perez, 734 A.2d at 1259; see also William A.
Dreier, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising Liability: An Empty Gift to Plaintiffs, 30 SETON HALL L. REV.
806, 810–11 (2000).
162. See, e.g., Dean v. Eli Lilly & Co., 387 F. App’x 28, 30 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Beale, 492 F. Supp.
2d at 1377); Love v. Wolf, 58 Cal. Rptr. 42, 49 (Ct. App. 1967); cf. Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520
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Eastern District of New York case, In re Zyprexa Products Liability
Litigation, Judge Weinstein explained that “[i]n unusual cases, courts
have found that a drug manufacturer’s excessive promotion of its
product may negate or call into question operation of the learned
intermediary doctrine.”163 Judge Weinstein went on to caution that “[a]
plaintiff arguing in favor of application of the overpromotion
exception with respect to a prescription drug must establish with
individualized proof that such overpromotion caused the physician to
initiate or maintain the prescription at issue.”164 It is not enough, Judge
Weinstein explained, to make general claims of overpromotion
unconnected to the decision making process of the plaintiff’s particular
physician.165 Overall, apart from the—now statutorily overridden—
exception for vaccines, defendants have been very successful at
fending off attacks on the learned intermediary doctrine.166
C. An Exception for Physician-Industry Relationships?
Plaintiffs have repeatedly sought an exception to the learned
intermediary doctrine where the physician has a financial relationship
with the manufacturer.167 If the physician is not independent of the
manufacturer, the argument goes, he or she is not well-positioned to
evaluate the risk-benefit information the manufacturer provides, and it
does not make sense to conceive of him or her as the consumer. With
the notable exception of Murthy v. Abbott, discussed above, courts
typically reject plaintiffs’ claims that an exception to the learned
F.2d 1359, 1363–64 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding that the question whether an otherwise valid warning could
be rendered ineffective by overpromotion was a question of fact for the jury to decide); Incollingo v.
Ewing, 282 A.2d 206, 219–20 (Pa. 1971) (same), abrogated on other grounds by Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz,
421 A.2d 1027 (Pa. 1980).
163. Head v. Eli Lilly & Co. (In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig.), 649 F. Supp. 2d 18, 33 (E.D.N.Y.
2009), aff’d, 394 F. App’x 819 (2d Cir. 2010).
164. Id.
165. See id.; see also Dean, 387 F. App’x at 30 (“Although the record reflects a vigorous sales campaign
for Zyprexa aimed at Dr. Rousseau, Dean points to no evidence that Lilly’s salespeople either misled Dr.
Rousseau about the link between Zyprexa and diabetes or caused Dr. Rousseau to prescribe Zyprexa to
Dean.”).
166. See Hall, supra note 7, at 217.
167. See generally Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 1999); Trimble v. Eli Lilly & Co.
(In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 04-MD-1596, 06-CV-3457, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109843
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2010).
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intermediary doctrine is appropriate where a physician has a financial
relationship with a manufacturer.168 One court went so far as to
pronounce that if a physician has “allowed himself to become a mere
conduit” for a manufacturer, that is the fault of the doctor, not the drug
or device company.169 A drug company, the court opined, “cannot
remove a physician from the decision making process, only the
physician can do that by avoiding his responsibility to make an
individualized balancing of the risks and benefits associated with a
drug and to advise the patient of possible adverse reactions.”170
In Talley v. Danek Medical, a 1999 Fourth Circuit decision
reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the court set forth
the following rule for evaluating the significance of a physician’s
conflict of interest.171 If a doctor is “an employee of [the
manufacturer,]” the Talley court held, “or so closely related to [the
manufacturer] that he could not exercise independent professional
judgment, a question could legitimately be raised as to whether he was
an intermediary.”172 To resolve that “complex question,” the court
said, it would have to evaluate “the nature of the relationship between
the manufacturer and the physician and the extent to which the
physician was in fact afforded independence in making medical
judgments.”173
The ties between the physician in Talley, Hallett Mathews, and the
defendant manufacturer were different in kind and degree than those
in Murthy. As the court explained, Dr. Mathews:
served as a consultant to [the defendant] Danek, designing
endoscopes and assisting in efforts to secure FDA approval for the
use of the endoscopes in the spine . . . . As part of this consulting
arrangement, Dr. Mathews’ office served as a ‘receptorship site’
168. See Talley, 179 F.3d at 163–64.
169. Burton v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig.), 955 F. Supp.
700, 706 (E.D. Tex. 1997), aff’d sub nom. Harrison v. Am. Home. Prods. Corp. (In re Norplant
Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig.), 165 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1999).
170. Id.
171. Talley, 179 F.3d at 163–64.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 164.
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[sic] to teach surgeons surgical techniques involving both Danek
products and other products. For these consulting services, Dr.
Mathews received an annual consulting fee of $250,000, a travel
budget, research funds, and 25,000 shares of stock in Danek
Group, Inc., the parent of Danek Medical, Inc.174

Despite Dr. Mathews’ close and extensive ties to Danek, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment,
finding as a matter of law that Dr. Mathews’ financial ties to Danek
did not interfere with his independent medical judgment and that it was
therefore appropriate to apply the learned intermediary doctrine to bar
the plaintiff’s claims.175
The Talley court reasoned that (1) Dr. Mathews’ consulting
relationship with Danek involved endoscopes whereas the case at hand
involved an internal fixation device, (2) Dr. Mathews offered
testimony explaining how he selects which device to use and
supporting his choice of the Dyna-Lok internal fixation device in the
plaintiff’s case, (3) Dr. Mathews continued to use the Dyna-Lok
device, and (4) Dr. Mathews did not use the Dyna-Lok device
exclusively—he did not always use an internal fixation device and,
when he did, he used more than one type.176 The significance of these
four facts is not self-evident. None would seem to preclude a conflict.
The FDA’s regulations require that research sponsors inform the
agency when annual payments to investigators exceed $25,000 a
year.177 Sponsors are encouraged to take steps to manage the risk to
research integrity posed by payments that exceed the $25,000
threshold.178 Dr. Mathews received ten times that amount from
Danek.179 The Public Health Service’s (PHS) regulations, which apply
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 157.
Id. at 164.
Id.
21 C.F.R. §§ 54.2(f) & 54.4 (1999).
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR CLINICAL
INVESTIGATORS, INDUSTRY, AND FDA STAFF: FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE BY CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS pt.
IV.A.2 (2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/
UCM341008.pdf.
179. Talley, 179 F.3d at 157.
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to, among other things, institutions that receive funding from the
National Institutes of Health, are triggered at $5,000 a year; Dr.
Mathews received fifty times that.180 The FDA’s regulations also
require reporting of equity stakes in public companies worth more than
$50,000 and any equity stake in private companies, while the PHS’
regulations apply to equity stakes in public companies worth more than
$5,000 and any equity stake in private companies.181 The Talley court,
by contrast, made its decision without regard to the value of Dr.
Mathew’s 25,000 shares of Danek.182
Other courts have been similarly dismissive of the possibility of an
exception to the learned intermediary doctrine where the physician has
a financial relationship with the manufacturer.183 For example, in a
2006 directed verdict ruling in the In re Vioxx Cases, the California
Superior Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that an exception to
the doctrine was warranted because the physician in question was paid
“hundreds of thousands of dollars over the years to conduct research
and give lectures.”184 The court credited the physician’s own testimony
that he was unbiased by his relationship with the defendant, testimony
that the plaintiffs did not counter with “evidence of actual bias.”185
In explaining its decision, the In re Vioxx Cases court took note of
the fact that while “payment for research is a widespread
practice . . . the court was unable to find a case where a physician who
was paid for research was considered to have abrogated his or her role
of learned intermediary.”186 The court went on to suggest that if it were
180. Id.; 42 C.F.R. § 50.603 (2011).
181. 42 C.F.R. § 50.603; 21 C.F.R. § 54.2(b).
182. Talley, 179 F.3d at 157.
183. See, e.g., Trimble v. Eli Lilly & Co. (In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 04-MD-1596, 06CV-3457, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109843, at *27–29 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2010) (applying the learned
intermediary doctrine where physician “conducted paid research” and “served as a paid speaker” for the
defendant); Tracy v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 569 N.E.2d 875, 876, 879 (Ohio 1991) (applying the
learned intermediary doctrine because while the defendant, Merrell Dow, paid the plaintiff’s physician,
Dr. Donald Epstein, $15 for each participant the physician enrolled in a clinical trial of the anti-smoking
drug Nicorette, there was no evidence that the doctor was “an employee of Merrell Dow or . . . was acting
under the control of Merrell Dow”).
184. Ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion for Directed Verdict on Defendant’s Learned Intermediary Doctrine
Defense, supra note 134, at 4.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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to hold that such payments alone did constitute “special
circumstances[,]” it would create practical problems for the
manufacturer, which “would have to obtain the patient list of every
physician it pays for research in order to somehow provide direct
warnings.”187
In a 2011 summary judgment decision that is part of the Trasylol
multi-district litigation, the court similarly declined to adopt the
plaintiff’s argument that the learned intermediary doctrine should not
apply because her doctor, Stanley K. Lochridge, was “biased and failed
to exercise independent medical judgment.”188 Dr. Lochridge, the
court explained, “signed an agreement with Bayer [Trasylol’s
manufacturer] to act as a temporary consultant at a cardiac meeting
held on December 10-12, 2004 where Trasylol and other drugs were
discussed.”189 Pursuant to the agreement, Dr. Lochridge was
reimbursed for his travel-related expenses and was paid a maximum of
$500 for his consulting services.190
The court agreed with prior decisions holding that plaintiffs have to
do more than present evidence of the fact of a financial relationship to
create an issue of material fact with regard to the applicability of the
learned intermediary doctrine.191 To successfully defend against the
manufacturer’s motion for summary judgment, the court held, the
plaintiff would have had to “offer evidence that Dr. Lochridge’s choice
to prescribe Trasylol . . . was not an informed one, or that he did not
exercise individualized medical judgment in making that decision.”192
The court’s decision also tracked prior decisions in that in addition
to crediting factors like Dr. Lochridge’s “undisputed experience as a
cardiothoracic surgeon and with prescribing Trasylol[,]” it afforded
significant weight to the doctor’s own testimony on the effect of his or
her financial relationships on his or her decision making.193 The court
187. Id.
188. In re Trasylol Prods. Liab. Litig.-MDL-1928, Nos. 08-cv-80386, 08-MD-01928, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 57057, at *15 (S.D. Fla. May 23, 2011).
189. Id. at *4.
190. Id.
191. Id. at *15–16.
192. Id. at *15.
193. Id. at *16.
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noted that “Dr. Lochridge’s testimony and the agreement itself indicate
that its purpose was for Dr. Lochridge to attend one cardiac meeting[,]”
at which, according to Dr. Lochridge’s testimony, “Trasylol and other
drugs were discussed.”194 In addition, again per Dr. Lochridge’s own
testimony, his “decision to prescribe Trasylol was [not] automatic; on
the contrary, he testified that [he] considered the particular
circumstances of [the plaintiff’s] case, including that she was going to
undergo a surgery with a significant risk of blood loss.”195
IV. PHYSICIAN-INDUSTRY RELATIONSHIPS IN PHARMACEUTICAL AND
MEDICAL DEVICE ECONOMIC INJURY ACTIONS
In the personal injury cases discussed in the previous section, courts
held that physicians could serve as learned intermediaries despite
financial relationships with the defendant manufacturers.196 In drug
and device cases in which the plaintiffs seek compensation for
economic injuries, courts have similarly found or presumed that
physicians’ prescribing decisions were informed, individualized, and
independent.197 The plaintiffs in these cases typically allege that they
bought or paid for drugs or devices that would not have been
prescribed but for the fact that the manufacturer’s promotional tactics
violated one of the numerous state and federal laws to which
prescription drug and device promotion must conform,198 including the
Federal Food Drug & Cosmetic Act (FDCA)199 and the Anti-Kickback
Act (AKA).200
Drug and device cases in which economic injury is alleged have
proliferated in recent years, typically following closely on the heels of
an announcement by the Department of Justice or other government

194. In re Trasylol Prods. Liab. Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57057, at *16.
195. Id.
196. See discussion supra Part III.A.
197. See discussion infra Part IV.
198. See generally In re Actimmune Mktg. Litig., 614 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Roberson v.
Medtronic, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 2d 864 (W.D. Tenn. 2007).
199. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399f (2012).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b).
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entity that it has entered into a settlement with a manufacturer.201
These cases can be brought by patients—usually a putative class of
patients—or by third-party payers such as employers, union health and
welfare funds, insurance companies, and others.202 The defense lawyer
James Beck writes, colorfully, that so-called third-party payer suits
arise out of an “unholy alliance” between payers and plaintiffs’
lawyers.203 He argues that third-party payers should and do lose these
suits because, “having already set their premiums and recovered for
their expenses . . . they can[not] prove that anybody was actually
hurt.”204 The independent physician heuristic also stands in the way.
Third-party payer and other economic injury suits are frequently
dismissed at an early stage as a matter of law, on the grounds that the
independent decision making of physicians breaks the chain of
causation between a defendant manufacturer’s illegal promotion and
the obligation to pay for a prescription drug or device.205
Neither the FDCA nor the AKA has a private right of action, so
those harmed when a drug is promoted fraudulently or illegally cannot
simply allege that one of those statutes was violated.206 An insurance
company or other third-party payer who covered and paid out claims
for such a drug or device will instead bring suit alleging, among other
things, common law fraud, violations of state consumer protection
statutes, and civil Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO) offenses.207
201. See, e.g., Health Care Serv. Corp. v. Olivares, No. 2:10-CV-221-TJW-CE, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
117750, at *6–7 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2011) (magistrate judge’s report and recommendation) (“HCSC
alleges that when Pfizer settled its claims with the United States in September 2009, [third-party payers]
like HCSC began to understand the fraudulent behavior of some of Pfizer’s agents related to the marketing
of various drugs.”).
202. James M. Beck, TPPs Hoisted by Their Own Petard?, DRUG & DEVICE L. (July 5, 2012),
http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2012/07/tpps-hoisted-by-their-own-petard.html.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
206. 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (2012) (“Except as provided in subsection (b), all such proceedings for the
enforcement, or to restrain violations, of this chapter shall be by and in the name of the United States.”);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Linea Latina De Accidentes, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 2d 837, 850 (D. Minn. 2011) (“At least
one circuit court of appeals and many district courts have held that there is no private right of action to
enforce § 1320a-7b(b).”).
207. See, e.g., District 1199P Health & Welfare Plan v. Janssen, L.P., 784 F. Supp. 2d 508, 518, 530,
531 (D.N.J. 2011).
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The common law fraud cause of action poses a number of
difficulties for plaintiffs, including heightened pleading standards and
barriers to certification as a class action.208 With regard to the latter,
courts typically decline to certify consumer fraud class actions because
there are questions of fact that are unique to each class member.209 In
particular, individuals typically vary as to whether and to what extent
they relied on the alleged fraud when they made the decision to
purchase the product at issue.210 Where the alleged fraud crossed state
lines, as is often true in drug and device cases brought by patients and
payers, plaintiffs also confront the absence of a common question of
law.211
Plaintiffs have had somewhat better luck pursuing class action
certification based on violations of state consumer protection
statutes.212 As defense attorney Joseph Leghorn and his colleagues
have explained, these statutes “generally proscribe ‘unfair or deceptive
acts or practices’ in connection with trade or commerce,”213 and, in
almost every state, they have a private right of action.214 Many states’
consumer protection statutes allow for actual damages but also provide
for “minimum statutory damages as well as multiple damages, punitive
damages, and attorneys’ fees.”215 As compared to common law fraud,
208. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”); Shawn S. Ledingham, Jr., Note, Aggregate Reliance and
Overcharges: Removing Hurdles to Class Certification for Victims of Mass Fraud, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
289, 290–91 (2010).
209. Ledingham, supra note 208, at 290–91.
210. Id. at 291.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., In re Celexa & Lexapro Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 751 F. Supp. 2d 277, 287–88 (D.
Mass. 2010) (applying California’s False Advertising Law, under which a “‘presumption, or at least an
inference, of reliance arises whenever there is a showing that a misrepresentation was material,’” and
holding that “[b]ased on the facts alleged . . . a reasonable juror could find that knowledge of the Lundbeck
study would be material to a physician’s decision to prescribe Celexa and that such materiality was proof
that [the plaintiff’s son’s] physician (and the physicians of the other class members) relied on Forest’s
alleged misrepresentations in deciding to prescribe Celexa”); see also Joseph J. Leghorn, Christopher
Allen, Jr. & Tavares Brewington, Defending an Emerging Threat: Consumer Fraud Class Action Suits in
Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Products-Based Litigation, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 519, 519 (2006)
(“Consumer fraud class action suits describe a relatively new species of products-based litigation that
have found fertile ground in the pharmaceutical and medical device landscape and are grounded primarily,
if not exclusively, upon violations of state consumer protection acts (CPAs).”).
213. Leghorn, Allen, Jr. & Brewington, supra note 212, at 519.
214. Id.
215. Id.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol30/iss3/3

38

Greenwood: Physician Conflicts of Interest in Court: Beyond the Independent

2014]

PHYSICIAN CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN COURT

797

these statutes facilitate suit by, depending on the state in question, 1)
declining to impose a heightened pleading standard, 2) eliminating one
or more of the common law elements, for example the requirement that
plaintiffs prove “specific medical causation,” and/or 3) lowering the
burden of proof.216
The civil RICO vehicle also has advantages for plaintiffs, including
the possibility of treble damages and a broad choice of venues.217 Even
more important, in the opinion of defense attorney Gordon Cooney and
his colleagues, by bringing suit pursuant to RICO, plaintiffs can
“sidestep the predominating choice-of-law issues that typically
prevent nationwide class actions based on fraud or deceptive practice
law.”218
To state a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must plead (1) the existence
of an enterprise affecting interstate commerce, (2) a pattern of
racketeering activity, which is defined to include, among other
enumerated predicate offenses, bribery, mail fraud, and wire fraud, that
persists for a substantial time period or threatens to continue into the
future, and (3) direct injury to the plaintiff’s business or property.219
The civil RICO statute requires that the asserted injury to the plaintiff’s
business or property occur “by reason of” the alleged predicate offense
or offenses.220 To meet the “by reason of” requirement, a civil RICO
plaintiff must show that the defendant’s offense was not just the “but
for” cause of his or her injury but also that it was the proximate
cause.221 This “requires some direct relation between the injury
216. See id. at 519–20.
217. J. Gordon Cooney, Jr., John P. Lavelle, Jr. & Bahar Shariati, Back to the Future: Civil RICO in
Off-Label Promotion Litigation, 77 DEF. COUNS. J. 168, 169 (2010); see also Pamela Bucy Pierson, RICO
Trends: From Gangsters to Class Actions, 65 S.C. L. REV. 213, 258 (2013) (noting that “[u]sing RICO to
bring pharmaceutical fraud class actions is a recent phenomenon” and predicting that the “trend of using
RICO to bring class actions aimed at pharmaceutical fraud is likely to accelerate”).
218. Cooney, Lavelle & Shariati, supra note 217, at 169.
219. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity . . . .”); Id. § 1964(c) (“Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court
and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney’s fee . . . .”).
220. Id. § 1964(c).
221. Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, N.Y., 559 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2010) (citing Holmes v. Sec.
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asserted and the injurious conduct alleged. A link that is too remote,
purely contingent, or indirect is insufficient.”222
Notably, the Supreme Court has held that a civil RICO plaintiff does
not need to allege “first-party reliance,” that is, that he or she
personally relied on the defendant’s misrepresentations, in order to
show that he or she was injured “by reason of” a pattern of mail or wire
fraud.223 An allegation “that someone relied on the defendant’s
misrepresentations” can suffice.224 The RICO statute’s proximate
cause requirement has nonetheless proven to be a formidable hurdle
for third-party payers and other plaintiffs alleging economic injury
caused by illegal promotion of drugs or devices to physicians.225 Most
courts confronted with these cases have held that the physicians’
presumably independent and individualized prescribing decisions
break the chain between the manufacturer’s illegal promotion and a
third-party payer or other plaintiff’s obligation to pay for a drug or
device.
Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268, 271, 274 (1992)).
222. Id. at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). Borrowing from antitrust law, the Supreme Court has
explained that the directness requirement serves a number of purposes:
First, the less direct an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of a
plaintiff’s damages attributable to the violation, as distinct from other, independent, factors.
Second, quite apart from problems of proving factual causation, recognizing claims of the
indirectly injured would force courts to adopt complicated rules apportioning damages
among plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violative acts, to obviate the
risk of multiple recoveries. And, finally, the need to grapple with these problems is simply
unjustified by the general interest in deterring injurious conduct, since directly injured
victims can generally be counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys general,
without any of the problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more remotely.
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269–70 (citations omitted); see also District 1199P Health & Welfare Plan v. Janssen,
L.P., 784 F. Supp. 2d 508, 523 (D.N.J. 2011) (“In other words, the proximate cause requirement ensures
that 1) there are no independent variables that could account for a plaintiff’s injuries, 2) there is no risk of
duplicative recoveries by plaintiffs, and 3) there are no more immediate victims better situated to sue for
the injuries alleged.” (citing Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 658 (2008))).
223. Bridge, 553 U.S. at 649.
224. Id. at 658 (emphasis in original).
225. Other elements have also posed hurdles. See, e.g., McCullough v. Zimmer, Inc., 382 F. App’x 225,
232 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that plaintiffs failed to plead the existence of a RICO enterprise because
physicians who accepted kickbacks from defendant device companies did not “combine[] as a unit with
any semblance of an organizational framework or common purpose”); District 1199P Health & Welfare
Plan, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 529 (holding that plaintiffs failed to plead the RICO predicate act of bribery
because “the Complaint does not assert any instances where Defendants provided remuneration to a
physician and thereby caused the physician to prescribe Risperdal when it was not in the patient’s best
interests” and because the plaintiffs did not “allege that any ‘bribes’ to physicians resulted in prescriptions
for which Plaintiffs should not have paid”).
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A. The “Causal Chain of Injury” Hurdle
A 2009 decision in the In re Actimmune Marketing Litigation
exemplifies the difficulties plaintiffs in drug and device cases face
establishing causation under both RICO and state consumer protection
statutes.226 Actimmune was a proposed nationwide class action brought
by patients and payers who alleged that the defendant manufacturers
“engaged in a fraudulent and deceptive scheme to market and sell the
drug Actimmune®” to treat idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis (IPF), an
off-label use.227 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ marketing
campaign was multi-faceted, including
. . . disseminating a number of press releases, . . . sending letters
to patients taking Actimmune®, setting up booths at medical
conferences, setting up a registry known as the Actimmune® Safe
and Appropriate Use Program . . . for doctors to join and obtain
information, creating a nonprofit patient advocacy group called
the Coalition for Pulmonary Fibrosis, and sponsoring meetings
and medical programs for pulmonologists.228

The defendants also “sen[t] sales representatives to visit
physicians,” and “instructed and encouraged [them] to misrepresent
the state of scientific evidence relating to Actimmune® in treating
IPF.”229 The plaintiffs, the court wrote, “generally conclude that [the
defendants’ marketing] campaign caused physicians to prescribe
Actimmune®, and caused consumers and [third-party payers] to pay
for Actimmune®, despite an absence of scientific proof to support its
effectiveness.”230
The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ RICO claim, finding that the
“allegations relating to the causal chain of injury as a result of [the
defendants’] marketing efforts . . . [were] scanty.”231 The court held
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
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that the “[p]laintiffs need[ed] to allege what specific information the
individual plaintiffs or their physicians had about the drug, the extent
to which they relied upon that information, and that the information
relied upon was false, misleading or otherwise fraudulent.”232 In
particular, the plaintiffs needed “to allege that it was defendants’
allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations about Actimmune®, rather
than the scientific literature or any other factor, that led directly to the
plaintiffs [sic] injuries.”233
The Actimmune court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ fraud-based state
consumer protection law claims, on the grounds that the plaintiffs
sought to use the fraud on the market theory to “handwave” the lack
of connection between the defendants’ product promotion and the
plaintiffs’ injury.234 As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he fraud
on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and
developed securities market, the price of a company’s stock is
determined by the available material information regarding the
company and its business.”235 As a result, “[m]isleading statements
will . . . defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not
directly rely on the misstatements . . . .”236 Stephen Bainbridge and
Mitu Gulati characterize the fraud on the market theory as a proplaintiff litigation heuristic which creates a rebuttable presumption of
reliance where fraudulent statements are disseminated to an open
securities market.237
The Actimmune court declined to apply the pro-plaintiff fraud on the
market theory, because “the presumption of reliance does not work in
non-efficient markets like prescription drug ‘markets’ (if individual
232. In re Actimmune, 614 F. Supp. 2d at 1052.
233. Id. at 1053.
234. Id. at 1054. In a subsequent decision, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ non-fraud-based claims as
well, holding that “[t]he shortcoming in the consumer plaintiffs’ pleadings is simple: all of the consumer
plaintiffs fail to allege that their doctors believed that Actimmune was an effective treatment for IPF ‘as
a result of’ defendants’ off-label promotion of Actimmune.” In re Actimmune Mktg. Litig., No. C 0802376 MHP, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90480, at *30–31 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2010).
235. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241 (1988).
236. Id. at 241–42.
237. Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 24, at 118–19 (“Take the fraud on the market doctrine, which we
do not discuss as one of our ten heuristics. This is a pro-plaintiff doctrine which provides the plaintiff with
a strong presumption regarding the issue of reliance. It can still be seen as a shortcut though, because it
enables the judge to avoid deciding the often messy issue of reliance.” (footnote omitted)).
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patients purchasing drugs prescribed by individual doctors for
personalized conditions can even constitute a ‘market’) . . . .”238 The
court chose to rely instead on the pro-defendant independent physician
heuristic, keying in on, for example, the plaintiffs’ failure to address
the possibility that physicians relied on studies in the scientific
literature and not the defendants’ marketing campaign in making
prescribing decisions.239
The connection between the defendants’ product promotion and the
plaintiffs’ injury was also at issue in UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly, a
Second Circuit case decided in 2010.240 The plaintiffs in that case,
unions and insurers, alleged that the defendant, Eli Lilly, engaged in a
multi-faceted marketing campaign that misrepresented the safety and
efficacy of its second-generation anti-psychotic medication Zyprexa to
physicians.241 The district court certified a class of third-party payers
that alleged that Lilly’s actions constituted RICO violations.242 With
regard to the “causal chain of injury,” the plaintiffs put forth two
theories: the “excess price” or “loss-of-value” theory and the “quantity
effect” theory.243 Under the first, the plaintiffs claimed that their “harm
was the monetary difference between what the plaintiff class was
allegedly led to believe Zyprexa was worth and the actual economic
value of Zyprexa, taking into account the lesser efficacy and greater
harmful side effects allegedly hidden or misrepresented by Lilly.”244
Under the second, the plaintiffs argued that “they paid
for . . . prescriptions that would not have been written absent the
fraud.”245
The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s class action
238. In re Actimmune, 614 F. Supp. 2d at 1054. At least one other court has held similarly, expressing
a surprising degree of skepticism that there is a “market” for prescription drugs and devices. See, e.g.,
Heindel v. Pfizer Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 364, 380 (D.N.J. 2004) (holding that “there is no prescription drug
‘market,’ at least as that term is understood in the securities context. . . . The suggestion that consumers
might be inclined to take a drug with certain side affects [sic] if they could pay less for it, or that drugs
with certain side effects should cost less, defies both reality and common sense”).
239. In re Actimmune, 614 F. Supp. 2d at 1055.
240. UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2010).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 130.
243. Id. at 129.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 131.
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certification, holding that neither the excess price theory nor the
quantity effect theory was susceptible to generalized proof. With
regard to the excess price theory, the court held as follows:
[T]he [plaintiff third-party payers] do not allege that they relied on
Lilly’s misrepresentations—the misrepresentations at issue were
“directed through mailings and otherwise at doctors.” Because
only the TPPs were in a position to negotiate the price paid for
Zyprexa, however, the only reliance that might show proximate
causation with respect to price is reliance by the TPPs, not reliance
by the doctors.246

The Second Circuit also rejected the quantity effect theory. Under
this theory, the alleged chain of causation was as follows: “TPPs place
Zyprexa on their formularies as approved drugs, Lilly distributes
misinformation about Zyprexa, physicians rely upon the
misinformation and prescribe Zyprexa, and TPPs pay for too many
Zyprexa prescriptions.”247 While this causal chain had the advantage
of relative simplicity, it was “interrupted by the independent actions of
prescribing physicians, which thwarts any attempt to show proximate
cause through generalized proof.”248 The Second Circuit explained the
problem as follows:
Lilly was not . . . the only source of information on which doctors
based prescribing decisions. An individual patient’s diagnosis,
past and current medications being taken by the patient, the
physician’s own experience with prescribing Zyprexa, and the
physician’s knowledge regarding the side effects of Zyprexa are
all considerations that would have been taken into account in
246. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 134 (citation omitted).
247. Id. at 135.
248. Id.; see also United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa. & Reg’l Health & Welfare Fund v.
Amgen, Inc., 400 F. App’x 255, 257 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Moreover, the complaint failed to plead a cognizable
theory of proximate causation that links Amgen’s alleged misconduct to Appellants’ alleged injury.
Instead, the complaint proffered an attenuated causal chain that involved at least four independent
links, . . . [one of which was] doctors’ decisions to prescribe Aranesp and Epogen for [the uses at issue].”
(citation omitted)).
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addition to the alleged misrepresentations distributed by Lilly.
Furthermore, . . . evidence showed that at least some doctors
were not misled by Lilly’s alleged misrepresentations, and thus
would not have written “excess” prescriptions as identified by the
plaintiffs. This makes general proof of but-for causation
impossible.249

Thus, the physicians’ independent prescribing decisions stood
between the putative plaintiff class and recovery. The court did,
however, remand the case for further proceedings, holding that while
the quantity effect theory could not “support class certification, it is
not clear that the theory is not viable with respect to individual claims
by some [third-party payers] or other purchasers.”250 The Second
Circuit’s requirement that plaintiffs produce individualized proof of
causation would be challenging for even individual third-party payers
to meet, however, because each pays for prescriptions written by
multiple physicians.
In Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca, which was decided
in 2011, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs’
complaint, finding that “[i]n light of physicians’ exercise of
professional judgment, a patient suffers no economic injury merely by
being prescribed and paying for a more expensive drug.”251 The
plaintiffs were patients and health care plans who alleged that the
defendants inflated the price of the atypical antipsychotic Seroquel by
making false representations about its safety and efficacy.252 The court
held that to state a claim the patients would have had to allege that the
prescriptions for which they paid were either “unnecessary or
inappropriate according to sound medical practice—i.e., the drug was
either ineffective or unsafe for the prescribed use.”253 Even if “the
249. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 135.
250. Id. at 136.
251. Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharm., LP., 634 F.3d 1352, 1363 (11th Cir. 2011).
252. Id. at 1356.
253. Id. at 1363. The court explained that “[t]o make this showing, the payer-plaintiff must allege a
counterfactual: that her physician—had he known all the true information about the medication—would
not have prescribed the drug under the standards of sound medical practice because the drug actually was
unsafe or ineffective in treating the plaintiff’s condition.” Id.
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physician’s decision to prescribe the more expensive drug in lieu of a
cheaper alternative is the product of fraud[,]” the court held, liability
does not attach.254 The court’s rationale appeared to be that because
physicians have no duty to consider price in making prescription
decisions, patients prescribed safe, effective, and medically necessary
drugs suffer no compensable harm no matter what the price of those
drugs may be.255
The Eleventh Circuit also held that the plaintiff third-party payers
had no recompense, because they should have factored into the
premiums they charge the possibility of paying for “medically
unnecessary or inappropriate prescriptions—even those caused by
fraudulent marketing.”256 Fraudulent marketing by drug
manufacturers, the court concluded “is just another cost to be factored
into premiums.”257
The third-party payer cases discussed above turned on allegations
of false or misleading advertising and promotion, not—at least not
primarily—the payment of kickbacks. But courts’ “causal chain of
injury” analyses do not typically vary based on the presence or absence
of kickback allegations.258 For example, in Health Care Service
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1364.
257. Ironworkers Local Union 68, 634 F.3d at 1368.
258. See In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., Master Case No. 05-CV01699 CRB, Individual Case No. 11-CV-00310 CRB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111446, at *208, *224,
*226 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2012) (dismissing case in which the plaintiff accused the defendant of, among
other things, “paying physicians to attend presentations to induce them to promote and prescribe Bextra”
and in which the defendant admitted that “approximately sixty-five percent of all off-label Bextra
sales . . . were the result of fraud” because the plaintiff did not “make specific allegations that individual
physicians actually relied on these misrepresentations in writing the challenged prescriptions”); District
1199P Health & Welfare Plan v. Janssen, L.P., 784 F. Supp. 2d 508, 517, 524 (D.N.J. 2011) (dismissing
case in which the plaintiff accused the defendant of providing physicians with “expensive dinners and
lavish vacations in return for prescribing Risperdal, and excessive payments to physicians for conducting
clinical trials of Risperdal” because “Plaintiffs may not aver ‘causation by way of generalized allegations
and aggregate proof,’ because there are numerous factors that could influence a physician when deciding
to prescribe a certain drug” (citation omitted)); Phila. Firefighters Union Local No. 22 Health & Welfare
Fund v. Bayer Healthcare Pharm. Inc. (In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices &
Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, 3:09-cv-20071-DRH-PMF, 2010 WL 3119499, at
*3, *7 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2010) (dismissing case in which the plaintiff accused the defendant of, among
other things, “providing financial incentives to physicians as ‘rewards for past high-prescribing and
inducements to write future prescriptions for off-label uses of YAZ,’” because “[t]o assess damages, the
Court would have to delve into the specifics of each physician patient relationship to determine what
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Corporation v. Olivares, a 2011 Eastern District of Texas decision, the
plaintiff Health Care Service Corporation (HCSC), a third-party payer,
alleged that the defendant Pfizer, among other things, (1) “bribed or
promised kickbacks to doctors who prescribed Geodon for uses other
than those that were approved by the FDA,” (2) “made offers and
payments of illegal bribes and kickbacks to physicians during the
marketing of Lyrica,” and (3) “made or promised bribes or kickbacks
to doctors in exchange for the doctors’ promotion of [Zyvox] to their
patients.”259
The Olivares court adopted the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in
Ironworkers Local Union 68, calling it “a nearly identical case[,]”
despite the fact that the Ironworkers Local Union 68 decision makes
no reference to kickbacks.260 Following the Eleventh Circuit, the
Olivares court held that the plaintiff failed to adequately plead an
economic injury because the plaintiff did “not allege that any
physician, had he or she known all the true information about Geodon,
Lyrica, or Zyvox, would not have prescribed the drugs under the
standards of sound medical practice because the drugs actually were
unsafe or ineffective in treating their patients’ conditions.”261 The
Olivares court also followed the Eleventh Circuit in holding that
“HCSC assumed the risk that some of its reimbursements would be for
off-label uses—even those uses that may have been a product of the
alleged marketing fraud.”262
The Olivares court went on to hold that HCSC’s complaint was
subject to dismissal for failure to allege a “viable theory of
causation.”263 The court agreed with the defendants that “HCSC’s
complaint fail[ed] to sufficiently connect Defendants’ allegedly
deceptive conduct to HCSC’s payment for prescription medications”
damages were caused by Bayer’s alleged fraudulent conduct, as opposed to what damages were caused
by the physician’s independent medical judgment”).
259. Health Care Serv. Corp. v. Olivares, No. 2:10-CV-221-TJW-CE, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117750,
at *4–5 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2011) (magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). The district court
adopted this report and recommendation. Health Care Serv. Corp. v. Olivares, No. 2:10-CV-221-DF-CE,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112544, at *3–4 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2011).
260. Olivares, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117750, at *12.
261. Id. at *17.
262. Id. at *18.
263. Id.
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because HCSC did not allege that “it directly relied upon
misrepresentations by Pfizer or actually reimbursed patients for
prescriptions written by doctors who relied on Pfizer’s
misrepresentations . . . .”264 Kickbacks notwithstanding, the plaintiff
bore the burden of alleging and proving that “any doctors or other
health care professional relied on any Pfizer misrepresentation
promoting an off-label use, as opposed to relying on the professional’s
own judgment and expertise, when prescribing the drugs.”265
B. Unbreaking the Causal Chain: Establishing the Proximate Cause
of a Prescription
There are very few economic injury cases in which plaintiffs have
overcome the independent physician heuristic and successfully pled or
proved that they paid for prescriptions that were proximately caused
by the defendants’ illegal promotional efforts.266 An early example
was Desiano v. Warner-Lambert, a 2003 Second Circuit case in which
the plaintiffs were insurance companies seeking “to recover the
moneys they spent purchasing Rezulin[,]” a diabetes medication that
was unacceptably unsafe and had been withdrawn from the market.267
What distinguishes Desiano from the cases described above is that the
plaintiff insurers alleged (1) that they were a target of the defendant’s
fraudulent marketing scheme and (2) “that, had they not been deceived
by the Defendants’ misrepresentations about the safety of Rezulin,
they would have taken steps so as not to purchase Rezulin at the prices
set by Warner-Lambert.”268 Because the chain of causation bypassed
264. Id. at *20.
265. Id. at *25.
266. Interestingly, in a case brought by an auto insurance company against a physician group alleged
to have engaged in fraud—that is, a case in which the doctors in question were alleged to have joined the
RICO enterprise—the court declined to find as a matter of law that the doctors’ prescribing decisions were
independent. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. CPT Med. Servs., P.C., No. 04 CV 5045 (ILG), 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71156, at *17–18 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2008) (“Defendants argue that the Amended
Complaint should be dismissed because the doctors who referred and ordered the CPT tests made a
medical determination that the tests were necessary, and because the New York No-Fault laws have not
issued any statements regarding the reliability of CPT tests. This is not a proper objection at the pleading
stage. The district court must accept all allegations as true, including State Farm’s claim that the tests were
not medically necessary.”).
267. Desiano v. Warner-Lambert Co., 326 F.3d 339, 345 (2d Cir. 2003).
268. Id. at 349 n.9 (“Among the steps Plaintiffs might have taken were to exclude [Rezulin] altogether
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physicians, the Desiano plaintiffs did not have the same difficulty
establishing the “causal chain of injury” that other third-party payers
have encountered.269
In 2007, in the Bextra and Celebrex multi-district litigation, a
District Court in the Northern District of California approved a theory
of causation that did not bypass physicians.270 The plaintiffs alleged
that the “defendants convinced physicians to prescribe Celebrex and
third-party payors to pay for it—at 10-times the cost of traditional
NSAIDs—by falsely claiming that it is superior to traditional
NSAIDs.”271 The court found that the “unmistakable inference” was
that physicians must have been exposed to, and persuaded by, the
defendants’ deceptive advertising because “there [was] no reason for
physicians to prescribe and for consumers and third-party payors to
pay for Celebrex other than defendants’ false claims . . . .”272 It is
notable that in a subsequent decision, the court retreated from this very
plaintiff-friendly causation analysis, finding that it need not follow it
where less than 100% of the prescriptions at issue were caused by the
defendants’ deceptive advertising.273
from their approved schedules, set a low scheduled value, set a high copay obligation, and otherwise
dissuade doctors from prescribing it.”).
269. See In re Neurontin Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 257 F.R.D. 315, 333 (D. Mass.
2009) (explaining that third-party payers “have fewer difficulties regarding causation” than individual
consumers do, because they do “not have to prove that the misrepresentations caused a specific doctor to
prescribe Neurontin to an individual patient[,]” but rather that the third-party payers themselves were
“fraudulently induced to approve Neurontin for a specific indication”), vacated, 712 F.3d 60 (1st Cir.
2013). Notably, even third-party payers that were the targets of a fraudulent marketing scheme have been
barred from proceeding as a class. As the Supreme Court of New Jersey held in International Union of
Operating Engineers Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v. Merck and Co., “the commonality of defendant’s
behavior” was outweighed by “evidence about [the proposed class members’] separately created
formularies, different types of tier systems, and individualized requirements for approval or
reimbursement imposed on various plans’ members and, to some extent, their prescribing physicians.”
Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., 929 A.2d 1076, 1087 (N.J.
2007).
270. In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 05-01699 CRBe1,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102340, at *196–99 (N.D. Cal. July 10, 2007).
271. Id. at *196.
272. Id. at *198.
273. Health Care Serv. Corp. v. Pharmacia & Upjohn, Inc. (In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg., Sales
Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig.), No. 11-CV-00310 CRB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111446, at *216 n.7 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 2, 2012). The court also distinguished its previous decision on the grounds that it “involved
allegations of first-party reliance, not misrepresentations made to third-party physicians.” Id. In its
previous decision, however, the court wrote that “defendants’ alleged deception of the physicians, causing
the physicians to prescribe Celebrex, is an integral part of the causation chain.” In re Bextra & Celebrex,
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In 2013, the First Circuit issued opinions in three related appeals in
the In re Neurontin Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation case, in
which it gave its imprimatur to a causal chain of injury that
incorporated the decision making of the thousands of physicians who
prescribed Neurontin for off-label uses for which the drug was no more
effective than a placebo.274 The three appeals were brought by the
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan and Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,
respectively a health insurer and health care provider, by Aetna, a
health insurer, and by Harden Manufacturing Corporation and others,
self-insured employers. The district court granted the defendant
Pfizer’s motions for summary judgment in the cases brought by Aetna
and Harden Manufacturing on the familiar grounds that physicians’
independent decision making broke the chain of causation between the
prescriptions for which Aetna and Harden paid and the defendants’
fraud.275
Kaiser, by contrast, was able to overcome the presumption of
physician independence by pleading, and then proving over the course
of a five week jury trial, (1) that the defendants provided it with false
information, (2) that it relied on the information to develop its
formulary, and (3) that its physicians in turn relied on the formulary in
writing prescriptions.276 The “jury found that Pfizer engaged in a RICO
enterprise that committed mail and wire fraud by fraudulently
marketing Neurontin for off-label conditions such as bipolar disorder,
neuropathic pain, and migraine, and at doses greater than 1800
mg/day” and the court found that Kaiser also succeeded in proving its
claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law.277 After trebling

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102340, at *203.
274. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. (In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig.),
712 F.3d 21, 42–43 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 786 (2013).
275. See Harden Mfg. Corp. v. Pfizer, Inc. (In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig.), 754 F.
Supp. 2d 293, 311 (D. Mass. 2010), rev’d in part and vacated in part, 712 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2013);
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Pfizer, Inc. (In re Neurontin Mktg & Sales Practices Litig.), 677 F. Supp.
2d 479, 495 (D. Mass. 2010), rev’d in part and vacated in part, 712 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2013).
276. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 712 F.3d at 40–41. Kaiser showed that it has a 95% rate of compliance
with the Kaiser formulary among its affiliated physicians. Id.
277. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. (In re Neurontin Mktg & Sales Practices Litig.), No.
04-cv-10739-PBS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99593, at *4 (D. Mass. Aug. 31, 2011).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol30/iss3/3

50

Greenwood: Physician Conflicts of Interest in Court: Beyond the Independent

2014]

PHYSICIAN CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN COURT

809

pursuant to the RICO statute, Kaiser’s award was $142,089,276.278
On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the verdicts in favor of Kaiser
and reversed the district court’s grants of summary judgment against
Aetna and Harden. The appellate court held that it had not been
necessary for Kaiser to show that it itself was a target of and relied on
Pfizer’s fraudulent promotion in order to establish a causal chain of
injury for purposes of RICO or California’s Unfair Competition
Law.279 The evidence that the plaintiffs presented regarding Pfizer’s
fraudulent promotion to physicians was sufficient to establish both but
for and proximate causation.280
The evidence presented included an expert report and testimony
from Dr. Meredith Rosenthal, a health economist who is a professor at
the Harvard School of Public Health.281 As Dr. Rosenthal explained at
trial, she “‘use[d] aggregate data and statistical approaches to link
patterns in promotional spending to patterns in prescribing for the
drug.’”282 The promotional spending data on which she relied
encompassed expenditures “on detailing of doctors, advertisements in
professional journals, and the retail value of samples.”283 While Dr.
Rosenthal was able to exclude from her analysis “the many off-label
prescriptions by physicians who received legitimate on-label
promotion[,]” she was not able to distinguish between off-label
promotion that was truthful and off-label promotion that was not.284
The district court found that, “given the pervasive nature of the
publication fraud that infected the nationwide sources of information
available to all physicians,” it was reasonable to assume that all of the
monies the defendant spent on off-label promotion were spent on
278. Id.
279. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 712 F.3d at 37 (“Here, like the defendants in [Bridge v. Phoenix Bond
& Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008)], Pfizer argues that its supposed misrepresentations went to
prescribing doctors, and so the causal link to Kaiser must have been broken. Even putting aside the
evidence of Pfizer’s direct communications to Kaiser, we think Bridge forecloses this argument.”).
280. Id. at 40.
281. Id. at 29. There was also “subsidiary evidence” that tended to show causation, including the fact
that Kaiser-affiliated physicians “attended conferences where Neurontin was promoted for off-label uses,
and after one such conference, in May 1999, new starts of Neurontin increased by 62%.” Id. at 31.
282. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99593, at *94.
283. Id. at *94, n.19.
284. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 712 F.3d at 30.
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fraudulent off-label promotion.285 The district court also found that it
was reasonable for Dr. Rosenthal to use national data on the number
of prescriptions written for each of the off-label uses at issue, based on
the assumption “that Kaiser’s patient population and physician
distribution are similar to the national mix.”286
Dr. Rosenthal performed a regression analysis on the data on
spending and sales and found that they were causally related to varying
degrees.287 At the high end, spending on off-label promotion caused
99.4% of Neurontin prescriptions for bipolar disorder, while at the low
end, it caused 27.9% of Neurontin prescriptions for migraine.288 Once
Dr. Rosenthal determined the percentage of Neurontin prescriptions
caused by Pfizer’s fraudulent marketing, a second expert, Dr.
Raymond Hartman, converted the percentages into a damages
estimate, using “a list of alternative drugs that ‘were more appropriate
for each off-label indication than Neurontin’ in order to determine the
average cost of the alternative medications that would have been
prescribed in the absence of defendants’ fraud.”289
Pfizer argued on appeal that Dr. Rosenthal’s testimony should not
have been admitted or credited because “an intervening cause—
individual physicians’ independent medical judgment . . . precludes a
finding of causation based on aggregate evidence.”290 The First Circuit
responded that “‘the burden of proving an ‘intervening cause’–
something which snaps the ‘causal chain’ (that is, operates as a
‘superseding cause,’ wiping out the defendant’s liability) that connects
285. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99593, at *95.
286. Id.
287. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 712 F.3d at 29–30.
288. Id. Essentially, then, the First Circuit allowed Kaiser to establish causation by demonstrating what
the Second Circuit termed a “‘quantity effect.’” UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 129
(2d Cir. 2010). The First Circuit held that there was no split in authority because
[T]he Second Circuit described the plaintiffs’ aggregate evidence of causation as involving
only an extrapolation from the fact that the number of off-label prescriptions for Zyprexa
fell after Eli Lilly’s fraud became known. This does not come close to resembling Dr.
Rosenthal’s evidence, which examined contemporaneous data that reflected what was
actually happening with regard to spending and prescriptions while Pfizer’s fraud was
ongoing.
Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 712 F.3d at 46 (citation omitted).
289. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 712 F.3d at 30, 32.
290. Id. at 45.
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the wrongful act to the defendant’s injury–is on the defendant.’”291 The
court also pointed to Dr. Rosenthal’s testimony at trial that “Pfizer’s
proposed physician-by-physician analysis of causation was
not . . . scientifically valid.”292 Dr. Rosenthal explained that it is
“‘neither standard nor appropriate to look physician by physician’”
because it is well-recognized in the field of healthcare economics that
“self-reporting from physicians about patterns of practice that may be
controversial shows both conscious reluctance and unconscious bias,
which lead them to deny being influenced.”293
The First Circuit explained its decision as follows:
In fact, the causal chain in this case is anything but attenuated.
Pfizer has always known that, because of the structure of the
American health care system, physicians would not be the ones
paying for the drugs they prescribed. Pfizer’s fraudulent
marketing plan, meant to increase its revenues and profits, only
became successful once Pfizer received payments for the
additional Neurontin prescriptions it induced. Those payments
came from Kaiser and other TPPs.294

“The fact that some physicians may have considered factors other
than Pfizer’s detailing materials in making their prescribing decisions”
could have an effect on the number of prescriptions attributable to
Pfizer and, therefore, on the calculation of damages, but it did not “add
such attenuation to the causal chain as to eliminate proximate
cause.”295
V. TOWARD AN AMPLIFIED ROLE FOR “LITIGANT REGULATION” OF
PHYSICIAN CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
As the preceding discussion suggests, courts can, consistent with at
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
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least a strand of current doctrine, move beyond the “independent
physician” litigation heuristic that stands between plaintiffs and
recovery in cases brought against drug and device companies. If the
doctrine were to evolve in this way, “litigant regulation” could fill in
some of the gaps left by the limited public regulation of physicianindustry financial relationships. This would bring closer the goal of
ensuring that patients and payers are fairly compensated for the harms
caused by conflicts of interest. Perhaps more importantly, it would
provide an additional incentive to drug and device companies to ensure
that the payments they make to physicians are legitimate.
A. Federal and State Regulation of Physician-Industry
Relationships
The regulatory scheme governing physician-industry financial
relationships is replete with gaps and characterized by under
enforcement. State attorneys general and medical boards have, for the
most part, remained on the sidelines.296 A new federal law, passed as
part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, will, when it is
fully implemented, require that financial relationships between the
drug and device industries and physicians be disclosed via a public
website.297 A handful of states have adopted similar disclosure
regimes.298 Clearly, however, disclosure requirements, no matter how
robust, do not add up to a comprehensive regulatory regime.
Conflicts of interest in clinical research are addressed by regulations
promulgated by the FDA and by the PHS, which demarcate
overlapping categories of financial relationships that pose the highest

296. But see Press Release, Synthes, Synthes Settles with New Jersey Attorney General and Agrees to
Reimburse Investigation Costs of US $236,000 (May 5, 2009) (announcing settlement between New
Jersey Attorney General and device maker pursuant to which device maker agreed to, among other things,
cease its practice of compensating physician-investigators with company stock).
297. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6002, 124 Stat. 119, 689–96
(2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7h) (amending Part A of title XI of the Social Security
Act by adding section 1128G and requiring pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers to disclose
payments made to physicians and teaching hospitals for, among other things, conducting clinical
research).
298. Joseph S. Ross et al., Pharmaceutical Company Payments to Physicians: Early Experiences with
Disclosure Laws in Vermont and Minnesota, 297 JAMA 1216, 1216–17 (2007).
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risk to the integrity of clinical research.299 These regulations, however,
are limited in both scope and effect.300
The FDA’s regulations only apply to potential conflicts of interest
that arise in the subset of clinical studies of drugs and devices that are
submitted as part of marketing applications.301 Under the FDA’s
regulations, the sponsor of a clinical trial must report to the agency (1)
any financial arrangement between the sponsor and any clinical
investigator the value of which could be affected by the trial’s
outcome, (2) any proprietary interest in the tested product held by any
investigator, (3) any significant equity interest in the sponsor held by
any investigator, with “significant” defined as an interest “whose value
cannot be readily determined through reference to public prices
(generally, interests in a nonpublicly traded corporation), or any equity
interest in a publicly traded corporation that exceeds $50,000[,]” and
(4) any significant payments, defined as payments in excess of
$25,000.302 The FDA specifically exempts from regulation payments
made to compensate investigators for conducting the clinical trial
itself, even if those payments are in excess of the investigator’s
costs.303 Information about the financial relationships that are covered
by the regulations is submitted to the agency after the clinical trials at
issue are completed.304 The FDA reviews the information to ensure the
integrity of the trials’ results, not to protect the rights and interests of
individual trial participants.305
The PHS regulations govern institutions that apply for funding for
clinical research from PHS agencies, including the National Institutes
of Health, as well as the individuals who conduct the research.306 The
PHS regulations are both more and less restrictive than are FDA’s.
Government-funded investigators must disclose to their institutions
299. 42 C.F.R. § 50.602 (2011); 21 C.F.R. § 54.1 (1999).
300. See generally 42 C.F.R. § 50.602; 21 C.F.R. § 54.1.
301. 21 C.F.R. § 54.1.
302. Id. §§ 54.2(b), (f) & 54.4.
303. Id. § 54.2(e).
304. Id. § 54.3.
305. 21 C.F.R. § 54.5(a) (providing that the information disclosed to the FDA is reviewed “to determine
the impact of any disclosed financial interests on the reliability of the study”).
306. 42 C.F.R. § 50.602.
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significant financial interests, defined to include (1) remuneration in
excess of $5,000, (2) equity in excess of $5,000 in a publicly-traded
entity, (3) any equity in a non-publicly-traded entity, and (4)
intellectual property rights, but only upon receipt of income related to
such rights.307
Public ex post regulation of physician-industry relationships is
similarly limited. The FDA and PHS regulations are, at least arguably,
under enforced. Both agencies have been the subject of highly-critical
investigative reports conducted by the Office of Inspector General of
the United States Department of Health and Human Services.308
Congressional and media investigations have uncovered multiple
instances of high-profile investigators who failed to make required
conflicts disclosures but suffered no serious consequences.309
Academic medical centers and private practice physicians who
conduct large numbers of industry-sponsored clinical trials are likely
to be audited by the FDA, but the FDA’s review is broad-based.310 The
financial disclosures that investigators are required to make to
sponsors are not a specific focus of the agency.311
The Department of Justice, working in concert with the FDA and
the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Health and
Human Services, enforces the Anti-Kickback Act against drug and
device manufacturers.312 This includes criminal prosecution, with
307. Id. § 50.603.
308. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION’S OVERSIGHT OF CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS’ FINANCIAL INFORMATION 15, 21, 23
(2009) (finding that the FDA responded inconsistently or not at all to the financial information that drug
and device companies disclosed to it, that the agency did not keep careful track of the information once
disclosed, and that fully 42% of the marketing applications it approved were missing required
information); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN EXTRAMURAL RESEARCH ii–iii (2008) (leveling
similar criticisms against the NIH including that the agency failed to track the conflict of interest reports
it received and that its response to them was inconsistent and infrequent).
309. See, e.g., Paul Basken, As He Worked to Strengthen Ethics Rules, NIMH Director Aided a Leading
Transgressor, CHRON. HIGHER ED. (June 6, 2010), (reporting that Dr. Charles Nemeroff, who failed to
disclose $1.2 million in payments from drug and device companies, “has largely avoided NIH restrictions
for [his] actions”), available at https://chronicle.com/article/While-Revising-Ethics-Rules/65800/; Tracy
Weber & Charles Ornstein, Doctors Avoid Penalties in Suits Against Medical Firms, PROPUBLICA (Sept.
16, 2011), http://www.propublica.org/article/doctors-avoid-penalties-in-suits-against-medical-firms.
310. Boozang et al., supra note 39, at 21.
311. Id.
312. See Katrice Bridges Copeland, Enforcing Integrity, 87 IND. L.J. 1033, 1048 (2012).
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settlements implemented via non-prosecution or deferred prosecution
agreements, both often overseen by independent monitors, and civil
enforcement, with settlements implemented via corporate integrity
agreements and also overseen by monitors.313 The Anti-Kickback Act
is also enforced through civil False Claims Act (FCA) suits brought by
private qui tam relators, joined, in some cases, by the DOJ.314 The
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act clarified that a claim for
reimbursement for a prescription written by a physician who was paid
a kickback is a “false claim” for FCA purposes.315 Through FCA suits,
then, the government can recover the losses it incurs as a result of
physicians being paid to prescribe.316 Losses to private payers and to
patients resulting from the same payments, however, go unredressed.
B. Moving Beyond the “Independent Physician” Litigation
Heuristic in Personal Injury Cases
In personal injury cases, the inquiry into whether the learned
intermediary doctrine applies or not should be expanded to encompass
not just the effect of a financial relationship on a physician’s decision
making but also the drug or device company’s intent in entering into
the relationship. If even one purpose of the payment or payments was
to reward the physician for prescribing the company’s drug or
device—that is, if the Anti-Kickback Act’s intent requirement is met—
then the learned intermediary doctrine should not apply.317
313. Kathleen M. Boozang & Simone Handler-Hutchinson, “Monitoring” Corporate Corruption:
DOJ’s Use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements in Health Care, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 89, 92–93 (2009);
see, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Minnesota-Based Medtronic Inc. Pays US $23.5 Million to
Settle Claims That Company Paid Kickbacks to Physicians (Dec. 12, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-civ-1623.html (announcing settlement to resolve
allegations that device maker used post-market studies and device registries as vehicles to pay physicianinvestigators kickbacks to implant the company’s pacemakers and defibrillators); Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Minnesota-Based St. Jude Medical Pays U.S. $16 Million to Settle Claims that Company
Paid
Kickbacks
to
Physicians
(Jan.
20,
2011),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/January/11-civ-078.html (same).
314. Kathleen M. Boozang, Note & Comment, The New Relators: In-House Counsel and Compliance
Officers, 6 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 16, 21–22 (2012).
315. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g) (2010).
316. See United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Group, Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 304 (3d Cir. 2011).
317. Tim Drake, Alexandra Kanu & Nick Silverman, Health Care Fraud, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1131,
1144 (2013) (“Most courts have adopted the ‘one purpose’ standard, whereby the Anti-Kickback Statute
is violated if one purpose of the offer or payment was to induce referrals.”).
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What, one might ask, justifies affording special treatment to
kickbacks? Congress chose not to provide for a private right of action
to enforce the Anti-Kickback Act. Moreover, the FCA ensures that
taxpayers’ interest in suppressing kickbacks is protected. In fact, there
is doctrinal support for “special” treatment for kickbacks. A central
justification for the learned intermediary doctrine is that physicians
independently weigh the costs and benefits of drugs and devices and
then make independent prescribing decisions. Clearly, the
manufacturer cannot warn itself of the dangers of its products and
avoid liability thereby. Similarly, manufacturers should not be able to
avoid liability by providing warnings to doctors they pay to prescribe.
Courts should presume that a physician who was paid a kickback is not
independent of the manufacturer making the payment, and so cannot
function as a learned intermediary.
On the other hand, where a plaintiff alleges not a kickback but a
facially legitimate financial relationship between manufacturer and
doctor, the burden of proving that the doctor was not independent
should remain with the plaintiff. Physician-industry financial
relationships pose a risk to the quality of the advice that physicians
provide to their patients and that physician-investigators provide to
participants in clinical trials. This does not mean, however, that any
particular patient or clinical trial participant received bad advice, even
if the individual suffered personal injury.
In the Murthy v. Abbott case discussed above, the court initially
found as a matter of law that a facially-legitimate financial relationship
between a doctor and a drug company so undermined the doctor’s
independence that the company had to direct any and all warnings
about the drug’s safety directly to the doctor’s patients.318 The Murthy
court reached this conclusion without apparent regard for the nature,
size, or scope of the financial ties at issue.319 On the one hand, this
approach—which the Murthy court eventually stepped back from—
318. See supra text accompanying notes 11–16.
319. Murthy v. Abbott Labs., 847 F. Supp. 2d 958, 972 n.5 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (noting that “[a]ccording
to researchers, physicians may even be influenced by ‘token gifts’: ‘Social science research continues to
show that the impulse to reciprocate from even a token gift can be a powerful influence on behavior,
thereby producing a possible conflict of interest for the recipient (physician)’” (citation omitted)).
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took seriously the risk that even seemingly-benign financial
relationships could bias prescribing. On the other hand, it transformed
a difficult factual question into a question of law and, arguably, gave
the research compensation at issue too much weight in the process.
As the Murthy court held on reconsideration, it may or may not be
appropriate to apply the learned intermediary doctrine in cases in
which the plaintiff alleges that there was a facially legitimate financial
relationship between the defendant manufacturer and the plaintiff’s
doctor.320 The factual questions raised when a plaintiff plausibly
pleads that his or her doctor had a financial relationship with the
defendant manufacturer are many.
Among the questions raised by physician-industry relationships are
the following. Is there a de minimis amount below which concerns
about bias recede? Are there relevant temporal parameters? How does
the type of financial relationship affect the calculus? Some observers,
for example, would argue that compensation for conducting
research—of the sort that was at issue in Murthy—is either untroubling or on net a social good that should be encouraged. Others
believe that per capita payments for conducting research are
particularly problematic, especially where the physician investigator is
responsible for recruiting and enrolling his or her patients into the
clinical trial.321 That these questions lack easy answers argues in favor
of determination as a matter of fact, not law. A motion to dismiss on
learned intermediary grounds should rarely be successful in the face of
allegations that the defendant manufacturer had a financial relationship
with the plaintiff’s physician.
There are potential practical objections to the proposed doctrinal
approach. For one, to the extent that it opens the proverbial floodgates
to litigation, it could further strain judicial resources and unfairly and
undesirably handicap the life sciences sector. One response to this
objection is that courts would still have a plethora of tools for
disposing of drug and device cases at an early stage of litigation
wherever appropriate. In particular, it is important to note that in order
320. See supra text accompanying notes 21–23.
321. Boozang et al., supra note 39, at 10.
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to benefit from the presumption that a physician who was paid a
kickback is not independent, a plaintiff must plead and later prove that
the defendant manufacturer paid the plaintiff’s physician to
prescribe.322 This seems likely to be more straightforward than
pleading and proving a physician’s internal decision making process,
which should work to the benefit of plaintiffs, but plaintiffs will
continue to bear a heavy burden.
Another potential practical objection is that an exception to the
learned intermediary doctrine that rested on a case-by-case evaluation
of financial ties between a manufacturer and the many physicians with
whom it works would be difficult to implement. At least one court has
opined that it would be difficult or impossible for a company to
determine who the patients of the physicians it compensates are, let
alone to warn each of them directly of the risks posed by its drug or
device.323 Here, one could respond by challenging the premise that
drug and device companies could not, in a data-centric age in which
direct-to-consumer marketing is ubiquitous, convey adequate
warnings directly to patients.
Finally, an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine for
physician-industry relationships could be criticized on policy grounds.
Clearly, such an exception would serve the individual plaintiffs whose
cases would be dismissed without it. The question arises whether it
would also serve the larger goal of ensuring that patients have the
information and advice they need to make the best possible decisions
about their healthcare.
The exception would create an incentive for manufacturers to warn
patients directly of the risks posed by drugs and devices, but patients
are unlikely to do a better job weighing the benefits and risks of a drug
or device than doctors are.324 For example, patients are much more
322. Cf. United States v. Mathur, No. 2:11-cr-00312-MMD-PAL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143197, at
*20 (D. Nev. Sept. 13, 2012) (discussing the Anti-Kickback Act’s stringent specific intent requirement).
323. Ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion for Directed Verdict on Defendant’s Learned Intermediary Doctrine
Defense, supra note 134, at 5.
324. See Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 163 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Even if the manufacturer
could be assured that the patient received the warnings, this practice might not be beneficial because ‘the
information regarding risks is often too technical for a patient to make a reasonable choice.’ . . . One of
the important functions of the physician is to determine the risks and explain them to the patient in a way
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likely than their doctors are to under-appreciate prospective benefits
and overreact to potential risks. As Christopher Robertson notes,
where there is “epistemic asymmetry[,]” as there is between a doctor
and his or her patient, expert advice, even if conflicted, may be
preferable to no advice.325 A partial response to this criticism of a
conflict of interest exception to the learned intermediary doctrine is
that such an exception would not force patients to weigh the benefits
and risks of drugs and devices alone, without the guidance of their
personal physicians. Manufacturers would continue to be obligated to
provide physicians with safety information about their products, and
physicians would continue to be responsible for factoring that
information into their prescribing decisions. All that would change is
that, in cases in which a physician had a conflict of interest,
manufacturers would also be obligated to provide the safety
information directly to the physician’s patients.326
C. Moving Beyond the “Independent Physician” Litigation
Heuristic in Economic Injury Cases
In economic injury cases, courts should follow the First Circuit’s
decision in Kaiser Foundation Health Plan v. Pfizer and allow
plaintiffs to use standard statistical methods such as regression
analysis to demonstrate that kickbacks or other financial relationships
influenced physicians’ prescribing decisions in the aggregate. As the
that can be understood.”); see also Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Expert Paternalism, 64 FLA. L. REV. 721, 750
(2012) (“[A] range of studies show experts’ superiority. Experts do make accurate, well-calibrated
judgments, using appropriate amounts and types of information.”).
325. Christopher Tarver Robertson, Biased Advice, 60 EMORY L.J. 653, 677 (2011).
[W]here epistemic asymmetry is high, a ban on conflicted advice would be very bad policy,
unless the policymaker can be confident that non-conflicted advisors would replace the
conflicted advisors. Such replacement is not an obvious outcome of a ban on conflicted
advice. To the extent that an advisor has a conflicting interest, the advisory services are
being subsidized by some outside source. . . . Thus, policymakers must ask whether the
asymmetry is greater than the bias ratio, and whether there is a viable alternative epistemic
and economic relationship.
Id.
326. Note that one could also argue that a conflict of interest exception would not go far enough and
that, given the changes that have taken place in the practice of medicine, patients should in all cases be
directly informed of the benefits and risks of drugs and devices. See State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp.
v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899, 912–13 (W. Va. 2007) (relying heavily on the existence and increasing prevalence
of direct-to-consumer advertising in deciding not to adopt the learned intermediary doctrine at all).
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First Circuit held, “regression analysis is a well recognized and
scientifically valid approach to understanding statistical data, and
courts have long permitted parties to use statistical data to establish
causal relationships.”327
Allowing plaintiffs to prove causation in the aggregate would lead
to significantly more “litigant regulation” of physician conflicts of
interest. For one, it would make class action lawsuits, whether brought
by patients or third-party payers, possible.328 As Maria Glover has
explained, “the class action device is likely able to function in the
context of RICO fraud claims if parties can allege causation or reliance
by means of statistical or aggregate proof.”329 Glover opines that “[f]or
small-value RICO claims . . . mechanisms like the class action device
are critical to facilitate private enforcement.”330
Even in traditional lawsuits brought by individual third-party
payers, resort to aggregate proof is a practical necessity given the large
number of prescriptions likely to be at issue. Aggregate proof is
particularly appropriate in this context. If a third-party payer
establishes that it paid for more prescriptions than it would have absent
a defendant manufacturer’s fraudulent promotion, it is not relevant
which physicians contributed to the increase and which did not.
Allowing for aggregate proof of causation will not mean that all
harms caused by conflicts of interest will be redressed. In a case, for
example, in which the defendant manufacturer paid kickbacks to
doctors but did not make false or misleading representations about its
drug, a plaintiff may not be able to plead or prove the typical RICO
predicate acts of mail or wire fraud.331 Other RICO elements could also
prove difficult for plaintiffs to plead and prove.332
327. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. (In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig.),
712 F.3d 21, 42 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 786 (2013).
328. Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97,
101–02 (2009).
329. J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1137, 1191 (2012).
330. Id.
331. Such a plaintiff might be able to plead other RICO predicate acts such as bribery or honest services
fraud. See, e.g., Clark v. Conahan, 737 F. Supp. 2d 239, 267–68 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (holding plaintiffs could
bring civil RICO claims because they alleged honest services fraud).
332. See supra note 225.
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Establishing a concrete economic injury could also be difficult for
plaintiffs in conflict of interest cases, particularly where the drug in
question was safe and effective. In Kaiser Foundation Health Plan v.
Pfizer, the First Circuit emphasized that the district court’s damages
determination was based on evidence Kaiser produced—including
evidence from gold-standard, double-blind randomized controlled
trials—”that Neurontin was not effective for the four off-label
conditions as to which the district court and jury found liability.”333 A
plaintiff might allege, for example, that, if the defendant had not paid
doctors to prescribe its branded drug, the doctors would have
prescribed the drug’s much cheaper generic equivalent. Many courts
have held, however, that a patient who is prescribed a safe and
effective drug “has received the benefit of his bargain,” even if, in the
absence of the defendant’s illegal promotional efforts, the patient
would have been prescribed a less expensive drug that was equally safe
and effective.334
Finally, even if aggregate proof is permitted, plaintiffs will continue
to face challenges related to the element of causation. It will not always
be possible, as it was in Kaiser Foundation Health Plan v. Pfizer, to
use national data based on the presumption that a plaintiff payer’s
patient population and physician distribution were representative. It
will also not always be possible to presume that all of the promotion a
defendant engaged in was fraudulent. Distinguishing prescriptions
written by physicians who received legitimate promotion from those
written by physicians who received illegitimate promotion will also
not always be possible.

333. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. (In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig.),
712 F.3d 21, 49 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 786 (2013).
334. District 1199P Health & Welfare Plan v. Janssen, L.P., 784 F. Supp. 2d 508, 523 (D.N.J. 2011)
(“‘[W]ithout alleging that a product failed to perform as advertised, a Plaintiff has received the benefit of
his bargain and has no basis to recover purchase costs.’” (citations omitted)). The plaintiffs categorized
their “concrete financial loss” as overpaying for Risperdal for off-label uses due to defendants’ allegedly
fraudulent and deceptive marketing practices, which inflated the number of prescriptions of Risperdal
written and filled and increased plaintiffs’ co-payments and out-of-pocket costs. Id. at 519. The plaintiffs
did not plead that Risperdal was inferior to competitor drugs. Id. at 520.
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CONCLUSION
The recommendations set forth in this Article would, if adopted,
result in courts moving past the “independent physician” litigation
heuristic. In personal injury cases where there is a financial
relationship between a physician and the defendant manufacturer, the
question of the physician’s independence would become one of fact,
to be determined in light of factors such as the nature, size, and scope
of the relationship. Where the defendant manufacturer is alleged to
have paid kickbacks to a physician, however, plaintiffs would benefit
from a strong presumption that the doctor was not in fact independent
of the manufacturer and that the learned intermediary doctrine
therefore did not apply. In economic injury cases, courts would move
beyond the heuristic by allowing plaintiffs to use standard statistical
methods to demonstrate that physicians’ prescribing decisions were
not independent in the aggregate.
As Joel Demski has noted with regard to conflicts of interest in
business, “as with other economic activities, we balance tensions and
shy away from attempting to create a situation of zero failures as a
result of conflicts of interest, simply because pursuing such an extreme
goal would be uneconomic.”335 Demski goes on to express the
following fear:
[W]e have failed to appreciate, or have forgotten, the delicacy of
a well-crafted web of controls for managing conflicts of interest.
We tend to think in terms of a specific conflict or specific control
applied thereto: for example, assuring greater independence for
auditors or more outsiders on boards of directors. Yet reality is
multiple conflicts among multiple players, in the context of an
enlarged, interactive web of controls.336

In the medical treatment and clinical research contexts, allowing
“litigant regulation” to play an amplified role would move us closer to
335. Joel S. Demski, Corporate Conflicts of Interest, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 51, 52 (2003).
336. Id. at 53.
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the goal of “a well-crafted web of controls” that would fairly
compensate patients and payers for the harms caused by conflicts of
interest without deterring desirable collaboration between physicians
and industry.

Published by Reading Room, 2014

65

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 3

824

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol30/iss3/3

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:3

66

